The New REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

VOLUME XIX | New York, Wednesday, July 16, 1919 | Number 245

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ITALY will bear anxious watching. The disturbances reported from the various parts of the country have apparently not yet coalesced into a general revolutionary movement, but the Italian government will have to be extremely adroit and energetic if quiet is to be restored. Disorders are most grave in the industrial cities of northern Italy, but the towns of the Adriatic littoral, Palermo, and Rome itself are restless. Whether the army can be depended on to control the civil population is uncertain. It has been understood that the real reason why no steps have been taken toward demobilization has been the fear of the government that the discharged soldiers would promptly be enlisted on the side of the revolution. There may be significance in the reports from Palermo, where the troops arrived "too late to prevent pillaging." They did not arrive too late to be received by the crowd with applause and shouts of "No firing boys; we are not at the front. Here we are all brothers and all are against the vampires who have starved us." That was exactly how the amalgamation of the army and the civil revolution began in Russia.

BELA Kun continues to defy the Allies, who appear to be at a loss as to means for suppressing him. On its face this seems absurd. The Magyar republic is one of the smallest, weakest, most instable of states. Two hundred thousand men at most would rally to its defense, and these could not be well equipped. Rumania alone could throw half a million men, well supplied by the Allies, against Bela Kun; Czecho-Slovakia and Jugoslavia also have large resources in armed men, and the Balkans are bristling with French soldiers. But who knows how far the views of Bolshevism have penetrated the Balkan populations? If ill considered action should be taken against the Magyar soviet state, it is entirely possible that the common soldiers might change sides as they so often do in Russian conflicts. What Paris fears, and has reason to fear, is a grand sweep of Bolshevism through Rumania, Slovakia and Croatia, joining up Soviet Russia with revolutionary Italy. The Italian press bureau in America threatens a combination of Italy with Germany and Russia unless Italy is admitted to the proposed Franco-Anglo-American alliance. Such a combination may indeed come to pass, but under a form not contemplated by the jingoistic Italian press bureau. A league of communistic states against a league of capitalistic powers; this may be the kind of world peace Paris has unintentionally been preparing.

THE political conditions in Germany that made Scheidemann hold out so determinedly against signing the peace treaty are becoming more and more clear. The Scheidemann cabinet rested, for its real strength, on the military genius of the German officers who gave their allegiance to the new government. Many of the leaders of that army which permitted Scheidemann and Noske to put down revolution in Hamburg and Munich declared that if the government yielded to the Versailles Treaty it must henceforth stand on its own feet. But the government has no feet of its own on which to stand. The army is disintegrating, through the defection of its officers. Haase, Hoffmann and other radical leaders are openly demanding "a dictatorship of the proletariat." The turn of the Independent Socialists is coming, now or later—a prelude to the rise of the extreme Left under men whose names are still unknown.

AMERICAN troops are to be kept on the Rhine as long as occupation of Germany lasts. That is the report which several correspondents have sent from Paris. Foch originally proposed that the United States and Great Britain share evenly with France in the maintenance of armies in Germany. This plan was opposed by President Wilson—at the time he also opposed the making of a separate Anglo-

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French-American alliance. Foch, these correspondents say, has had his way. A single American regiment is to be held in Europe so long as occupation lasts. One regiment will of course be of little practical use. But the French know that holding it on the other side would anchor American interest in Europe, and at the same time facilitate for France the work of putting the last work of the treaty into execution.

GENERAL DENIKIN'S army, in southern Russia, moves steadily forward. It has taken Kharkov and Ekaterinoslav—cities some four hundred miles south of Moscow. Does this advance constitute an immediate threat to Bolshevik rule in Russia? It is not likely. In the first place Denikin's strategy has never been to move on Moscow but to effect a juncture with Kolchak, advancing from the east. Denikin has gone forward, but Kolchak is not there to meet him. Not only has the latter lost his base, at Ufa, but the Bolshevik troops have now taken Perm, a full two hundred miles to the north. In the second place it is doubtful how much strength, in the way of transport, reserves and supplies, lies behind Denikin's first line. "The isolation here is unimaginable," cables Mr. Harold Williams, the English correspondent whose sympathies are all with the Cossacks. "At present Denikin's struggle is like a lonely fight with the cholera in some Indian back country station."

LLOYD GEORGE is invariably able to make a successful appearance in Parliament, but the reception he received last Thursday does not conceal the fact that he is now dealing with opposition from two wings of British opinion. He has for some time been threatened by industrial action on the part of the trade unions in protest against intervention in Russia and the maintenance of conscription. Now comes a report that some two hundred Unionist members of the Coalition are about to challenge his leadership. These men suspect a government plot to go in heavily for nationalization. Their immediate quarrel is with a new transport bill which would give extensive powers of control to Sir Eric Geddes, minister without portfolio. An effort both to please the Unionists and to conciliate the trade unions will require all the adroitness that Lloyd George possesses.

IN Paris the Supreme Economic Council has proposed that international cooperation in the distribution of tonnage and the allocation of raw materials be kept alive. The Council recommends to the Peace Conference that such cooperation be continued in some form until the Council of the League of Nations has had an opportunity to consider the present acute situation, and proposes that the Supreme Economic Council should be requested to suggest for the consideration of the several governments the methods of consultation which would be most serviceable for this purpose. At the time of the armistice four international economic boards were actively at work, and various proposals were made to the Conferencee, principally by the British delegates, for remodelling them to fit peace conditions. But the American delegates were little interested, and at that time the proposals were dropped.

SINCE the first publication of the terms of the peace treaty we have at times been given brief summaries of newspaper comment in England and France; but until Mr. Wilson's departure from Paris we had almost no word of Italian opinion aside from the dispute about Fiume. Now, however, certain comments on the general terms of the treaty have been cabled from Italy. "President Wilson leaves Paris," says the Popolo Romano, "convinced that peace, justice and liberty are smiling throughout the world. We do not share the Wilsonian optimism, believing that the advent of true peace will be possible only when peoples are allowed to correct the deplorable mistakes contained in the peace perpetrated at Paris by the celebrated tribunal of Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George. Until then the peace at Versailles will be weighing upon Europe like a nightmare."

OTHER Italian newspapers share conclusions of this sort. President Wilson, says the Tribuno, "returns to America, leaving behind him a chaos of disorder, passions, and disillusions, since he could not conclude peace according to his principles, but made a compromise brought about by the overbearing attitude of the strong toward the weak." Emphasis in the Tiempo is on the folly of France in her new choice of allies: "When the last American soldiers have sailed from Bordeaux and the last British Tommies have crossed the Channel, France will realize the inadvisability of having preferred a transoceanic alliance to an alliance with her sister across the Alps. America in the long run cannot have any interest in mixing in European squabbles, while England, with increased dominion over all seas, may dream of that hegemony which the Allies joined to fight when Germany wished to impose it on the world."

IT was because he favored reliance upon reserves and condemned the three-years' service plan that Jaurès, leader of the French Socialists, was so long termed a traitor by the militarists of France. And now, when Jaurès has been dead for five years, a former Minister of War, General Missimy, makes this statement before a government commission: "There is no doubt but that the French command, in 1912 and 1913, did not wish to rely on reserves. That was a great fault. It must be confessed we were mistaken. The general staff preferred to rely upon the three-year law—and that no one would defend today, after the experience of the war."

OWNERSHIP and operation of the oil wells in Mexico will be the center of any controversy which that country might possibly have with the United States. On this subject General Candido Aguilar, personal representative of Carranza in Washington, has given an interview to the newspapers. "Credence is given to stories, to individual stories, which have no basis in fact," he says. "A story printed this morning said that on May 16th troops were ordered to stop the drilling of wells on the property of certain companies. I know that no such order was ever issued. The only order issued has been that the Mexican law be enforced, and where this law conflicts with foreign interests we feel that we can make adjustments."

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"The Government has no desire to confiscate the property of the mine owners. We are not so simple-minded or unreasoning as to suppose that any good could come from such a policy. We are rather looking toward a taxation system that will be fair and equal to all, whether they be Mexican or American. We feel that the great natural resources belong to the people, but we have no desire to and shall not disturb the private owner so long as he works the resources."

DR. ANNA HOWARD SHAW was a splendid pioneer. The tradition of a family which struck out into the middle west when that land was still frontier Dr. Shaw carried on through the years of an active life. She was among the first women to be admitted to the ministry and to the practice of medicine. With Susan Anthony she was a pioneer in the long struggle for the recognition of the political rights of women. Nor did her battles ever sap the patience, the gentle humor and the tolerant philosophy with which she started. For the men of her country, no less than its women, her life stands as an inspiration.

FEARING a demonstration on the part of those in sympathy with the Bolshevik government, the police officials in New York City forbade a meeting in Carnegie Hall that had been planned by Russian societies supporting Kolchak. This action is an unwarranted attack on the institution of free speech. Friends of Admiral Kolchak have every right to champion his cause in America. If there was a real danger of disturbance at Carnegie Hall it was nevertheless essential for the meeting to be held and for the law to take care of the offenders. If there are not police enough in New York for that purpose then the city should be provided with more. We cannot have too safe a guarantee for the free expression of opinion.

"Unprovoked Aggression"

EVERYONE is still swallowing hard on the proposed French alliance. When first rumored, it was flatly denied; the rumor having been confirmed, Americans with practically no exceptions tried to forget about it. A project which should have excited great discussion has been discussed hardly at all for the obvious reason that it put everybody in an awkward dilemma; nobody much wants the alliance, and few wish to say no to France, or know how to say it.

Mr. Wilson's own reluctance is written all over it, and it must be admitted at the outset that if words can make an alliance innocuous the words of this alliance have been carefully chosen. Under it we are bound to go to war in two eventualities. First, if Germany violates any provision of the Treaty of Versailles concerning the demilitarization of her western border-land; second, if she commits "any act of unprovoked aggression directed against" France. Even these obligations can be annulled by a majority of the League's Council. If accepted by a majority of the Council, they can be abrogated later, if the United States for example should request it, by a majority of the Council.

This new Triple Alliance is in itself a majority of the Five Powers who are the real masters of the League. No member of the League not on the Council has any voice whatever in regard to this alliance. By what right do we make a treaty which says how the League may comfort itself in the face of it? This treaty instead of subordinating itself to the League makes its own terms superior to those of the Covenant. If France, Britain and America can say: "Our alliance is not subject to revision by the League except on terms defined in our alliance," what is there to prevent Japan or Italy from doing the same? Why shouldn't they form alliances with anybody they please, and write into them a clause saying: "These alliances are in conformity with the Covenant so long as two members of the League approve of them. We are those two members and we approve. Therefore the League's competence is at an end." This alliance violates the Covenant in a most fundamental way. It is as if New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania made special laws for each other's benefit, and then said that the constitutionality of these laws could not be reviewed except by a tribunal in which those three states were a strategic majority.

As the first fruit of the labors of the alleged Father of the League, this document shows a strange lack of acquaintance with the Covenant. But the befuddlement of thought does not end with a flat contradiction of the Covenant. We pass over lightly the fact that it flatly contradicts Mr. Wilson's own promises. Everybody remembers the address of September 27, 1918, in which Mr. Wilson stated "authoritatively" this "government's interpretation of its own duty with regard to peace":

> *Third, there can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understanding within the general and common family of the League of Nations.*

The reason why these cannot be, said Mr. Wilson the same day, is that "*Special Alliances* and economic rivalries and hostilities have been the prolific source in the modern world of the plans and passions that produce war. It would be an insincere as well as an insecure peace that did not exclude them in definite and binding terms."

Painful as it is to quote Mr. Wilson these days another quotation is necessary. It will be recalled that in December, shortly after Mr. Wilson's arrival in France, M. Clemenceau made a speech in the Chamber of Deputies which revealed with ad-

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mirable candor his antipathy to the Wilson programme. The speech as delivered was so rough and so frank that it was expurgated before it was finally published, about thirty-six hours late, in the Journal Officiel.

To this Mr. Wilson replied in his speech at Manchester on December 30, 1918, saying:

> If the future had nothing for us but a new attempt to keep the world at a right poise by a balance of power the United States would take no interest, *because she will join no combination of power which is not a combination of all of us.*

Yet Mr. Wilson is bringing home an alliance which is a combination of three of us that can be rejected only by the two least important of us among the Powers aided by three among the small ones of us; that the rest of us cannot alter before it is effected, and only the three of us can alter after it is effected.

How do we get around the fact that the alliance violates the address of September 27th, the terms of the armistice, the address of December 30th, and the spirit of the Covenant itself? By the invention of one of the most extraordinary phrases in the ingenious language of diplomacy, "Unprovoked aggression." The New Republic is prepared to offer anyone, including Mr. Wilson, a handsomely bound set of Mr. Wilson's speeches for a consistent interpretation of this phrase. If there is such a thing as an unprovoked aggression there must also be such a thing as a provoked aggression. Who under this treaty decides which it is? And having decided, what do we do in the case of a provoked aggression. Do we not come to the aid of the victim? In other words do we tolerate some kinds of aggression? Does the League have anything to say as to whether the aggression is provoked or unprovoked? Do we go to war under the treaty if it is unprovoked, and under the Covenant if it is provoked?

The words are sound, not meaning. They are put together not to signify a diplomatic reality but as propaganda for the alliance. They are a phrase like black black or noisy noise. Their purpose is to neutralize American objection by seeming to obligate us only to the very quintessence of sterilized innocence. They betray a lamentable confusion of mind and a gross exploitation of the gullibility of the American nation. If Mr. Wilson is simple enough to find comfort in them, to believe that they are not the traditional military alliance of European politics, he is indeed pure of heart. If he used the words to sugar-coat the truth, well—there is no use going into that now.

Let us examine this treaty by itself. It violates the Covenant; it violates Mr. Wilson's promises. All right, what if it does? There may be more important things in the world than documents and speeches. What are they? The safety of France. That is more important perhaps than the Covenant and certainly more important than Mr. Wilson's reputation. The safety of France from a repetition of the horror she has just suffered is a major interest of civilization. The question is whether this treaty provides greater security for France.

Before that question can be answered it is necessary to abandon the false picture of France which exists in America today. The French people are terribly hit by the war. They have suffered enormously, and their dread of another invasion is a fact. But there is another "France," the France of the bureaucrats and the political generals which moves and has its being behind the thickest censorship in the world. It is all nonsense to say that the people of France, the French nation, and the present French government are one and the same thing. The French nation knows what the censorship wants it to know and lets it know. French opinion is not in contact with the facts. It is in contact with a governmental press, and it is manipulated by that press.

The method of manipulation is this: the real dread of the nation is agitated and prolonged by suppressing news which confirms the utter collapse of the German power and by emphasizing and inventing incidents which suggest that Germany may at any moment repeat the aggression of 1914. Everything that the government wishes to do is then explained as prudence, or simply not mentioned at all.

The French government, absolutely cynical about the League, is engaged in constructing a system of alliances designed to make France the diplomatic and military master of the European continent. The keystone of that system is Czechoslovakia. This little state, so hopeful in its democratic promise, has been nursed by the Quai d'Orsay until it is making demands which in the end mean disaster for it. The official Czechoslovak representative in Paris was urging in August and September 1918 that German Austria must join Germany in order to stabilize peace in that part of the world. That obviously sensible application of the principle of nationality is rejected in the treaty on France's insistence and with Czechoslovakia's approval. Before the war ended the claim in the Slovak territory followed ethnic lines; by the time the Peace Conference was under way the Conference was offering President Masaryk more Magyars than he felt he could digest. Why? Because Czechoslovakia is conceived as a pawn in the diplomatic game, and according to the calculations of the old-fashioned diplomats in M. Pichon's office the

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larger the territory the more the military strength.

After Czechoslovakia Poland. The present Polish regime is in the most intimate relations with the French Foreign Office, and Poland is today the most aggressively expansive state in Europe. It is at war or on the verge of war with every one of its neighbors and it has more neighbors than any other nation on the continent. How many people know the connection between the French General Staff and the Polish army? Not many, for the censorship is rigorous. But the fact is that Poland is conceived by the French Foreign Office as the advancing member of the new series of alliances.

If M. Pichon succeeds, as he undoubtedly will, Poland will have a common strategic frontier with Rumania in defiance of all principles of nationality. For Rumania is the third in the system. Finally there is Jugoslavia. The orbit of that new state is not yet clear, for French diplomacy is torn between the desire to patronize Jugoslavia, thus keeping Italy busy, and the fear of antagonizing Italy too much. M. Clemenceau supported the President on Fiume, and then proclaimed his fidelity to the secret treaty. The Jugoslav issue cuts two ways, and that is why a decision has been so difficult. At the critical points from Warsaw to the Danube, from Mainz to Odessa, there are French officers as busily engaged in diplomacy as General Mangin is on the Rhine.

The whole elaborate manoeuvre has two motives—a public motive which is to build a barrier against Germany and Bolshevism; an official motive which is to make French diplomacy supreme in Europe. It is this second motive which is the real one, because the French Staff know perfectly well that Germany is prostrate and disarmed, that only extreme provocation and continual humiliation can cause national resistance. Of aggression there is no question. The utter ruin of the German steel industry and of German sea power make another 1914 beyond the realm of possibility. The Germans cannot overrun France with wooden sticks and razors.

The purpose of this treaty is not to protect France against a German invasion. The French government is not so unrealistic as all that. French diplomacy is seasoned, and it is not as sentimental as it may look. The French are not asking Mr. Wilson to sign this alliance to protect them against Germany. They know perfectly well that the League is every bit as good *protection* as this treaty. Whatever their other skepticism they know that America would resist "unprovoked aggression" under the Covenant just as readily as under the treaty, and with their control of the press they could just as easily as not make this plain to the French people.

The object of this treaty is to create a clique within a clique, a governing body within the Council, which is itself a governing body within the League. The object is to create a Franco-British-American bloc for diplomatic purposes. For the Quai d'Orsay knows, though Mr. Wilson may not, that the *words* of an alliance mean nothing, that the *fact* of the alliance is all important. With such a treaty signed the Quai d'Orsay believes that it can pocket American influence in the League, leaving Britain supreme overseas and France supreme in Europe. French diplomacy knows that such a combination is diplomatically invincible.

It knows something more. It knows how utterly incompetent and inexperienced American diplomacy in Europe is, how easily it is hoodwinked, how bad its sources of information, how ignorant of history, how tender-minded. Once America is "grouped" as the diplomats say, the Quai d'Orsay will speak in Europe for the group. That is the purpose of the Quai d'Orsay.

But there is another aspect to the matter. The United States is bound to go to war if Germany makes any military move west of a line fifty kilometers east of the Rhine. Now it is an avowed object of General Mangin, the French Commander on the Rhine, to separate the left bank of the Rhine from the body of the German Republic. There is no doubt whatever that this is one of the principal objectives of French official policy. Under Article XLIII of the Treaty of Versailles and under this proposed alliance, Germany is forbidden to put down insurrection in the Rhineland. There is nothing whatever in either of the treaties to prevent France from using coercion, bribery or intrigue to create a seceding government on the model of that recently attempted by Dr. Dorten. The use of military force by Germany to put down rebellion, no matter how engineered, is forbidden. It would not come under the head of "provoked aggression," for the demilitarization of this area is absolute. The "unprovoked aggression" clause, whatever it may mean, does not operate within fifty kilometers of the Rhine.

It is no answer to say that Congress would interpret our obligations under the treaty. France will have her interpretation, and if we fail to act as she will expect us to act, once this treaty is signed, we shall appear to the French people as a faithless nation. America cannot afford to make indefinite promises, to involve itself in this sea of intrigue. For the whole project has nothing to do with the defence of France against invasion or with the assumption of our share of the burden in maintaining the peace of the world. This treaty is in every respect the typical war-breeding alliance which has cursed Europe for centuries; it is on its face and

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in all its ramified meanings exactly the kind of entanglement against which every American statesman from Washington to Wilson has repeatedly warned us. It repeats every folly that ever cursed diplomacy from the grouping of hostile alliances to the dismemberment of nations.

It is the old diplomacy bursting through the shell of the League. Whatever promise there may be in the League this plan defeats. There is nothing here but pain and misery for the French nation. France has less than forty million people and she cannot hope for, she must not seek, mastery of the continent. The salvation of France lies in an orderly Europe of democratic nations acting openly and together. France can be safe only if she is content with equality of prestige and influence. Her present diplomacy is a mad adventure which will hurt no one so much as the French nation itself.

In so far as this treaty is part of the adventure it should be rejected. It has no real connection with the defense of France. It violates the Covenant. It violates America's "authoritative" statements. It will inflame jealousy. It will encourage counter-alliances. It will create parties within the League. It will discourage moderate administration of the treaty, and encourage the involved diplomatic intrigue of eastern Europe.

It is on the face of it absurd. To make a military alliance with the strongest military power in Europe against the only power which is disarmed has no military meaning whatever. It has only a diplomatic meaning. If we want to protect some nation in a special way, why in Heaven's name do we not offer the alliance to Belgium? That would protect France just as well, and could not be made into a diplomatic combination. An alliance with Belgium, assuming that we have no faith in the League, would symbolize the meaning of the war, would have no serious diplomatic consequences, and would bar the only feasible road into France.

We suggest that this alternative will test the sincerity of the plan. Let the Senators who are in doubt about this alliance propose instead a guarantee to Belgium, and see what reaction there is.

Protection of National Minorities

UNDER the treaty concluded between Poland and the Allied Great Powers a precedent is set for the protection of national minorities in all the new states to be created or enlarged in the final settlement. Nationality and rights of citizenship are not to be identified with race and language, still less with religion. All persons born in Polish territory, not by free choice nationals of another state, become ipso facto Polish nationals, to enjoy equality before the law without distinction as to race, language or religion. There shall be no language restrictions on Polish nationals. Nationals of non-Polish speech are free to use their own language even in the courts, in spite of the establishment of Polish as the official language. In districts distinctly non-Polish the language of the minority shall be the medium of instruction in the public primary schools, although the teaching of Polish may be made obligatory.

These are liberal provisions: are they merely paper provisions, like similar guarantees subscribed by the Balkan States in the ante-bellum era of insincerities? They are declared explicitly to be matters of international concern, falling within the competence of the League of Nations. The Polish government might fall into the hands of the reactionaries who would like to Polonize or banish every German, Czecho-Slovak, Ukrainian, White Russian or Lithuanian within the boundaries of the republic. That cannot be done, under the treaty, except with the consent of the majority of the Council of the League. Any infraction of the rule or threatened infraction, may be reported to the Council by any member of the League, and the League is authorized to take appropriate action. Differences of opinion as to whether the rights of minorities under the treaty have been violated are to be treated as international disputes under article 14 of the Covenant.

This is going far, an American might say, toward the destruction of national sovereignty. We have our own foreign speaking communities; should we care to have applied to ourselves international rules governing our conduct toward them? We permit our Little Italys or Little Hungarys to speak Italian or Hungarian as they please; we permit them to publish newspapers in their own tongue, to stage foreign language dramas, and the like. We permit it, but we hold ourselves free to prohibit it, if we choose. In the tolerant years before 1914 we yielded to the demand of some of those nationalities to insert their mother tongue in our public school curricula. We never dreamed that they could rise to the height of the arrogance of demanding that where they were in a majority the medium of instruction should be their language, and that English should be taught merely as a foreign language, so to speak. Imagine that such a demand came to the New York City educational authorities from one of the Italian colonies, and that Italy brought representations on the matter before the League Council, which proceeded to hear and determine. Yet that is what may happen in Poland, and if the precedent is followed, in Czecho-Slovakia, Jugoslavia, Rumania, Armenia.

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That may happen, and we shall see that it ought to happen if once we will disabuse ourselves of our besetting illusion that American conditions and European run on all fours. Our American English-speaking nationalism has at its roots an incontestable priority to the alien communities in its midst. Non-English speaking residents are here by their choice, not by ours. We have an undisputed right to determine the conditions under which they may come here and the conditions under which they may remain. It may be good policy or bad to make assimilation one of those conditions, but it is domestic policy. The treaty does not deny Poland a similar right to make conditions to which immigrants must conform. That treaty is intended to safeguard the rights of populations that are indigenous as the Poles are indigenous, that are members of the Polish state not by choice but by necessity. It is the only way out of a situation that would otherwise be intolerably unjust and hence a menace to the good will between nations.

On the Lithuanian frontier of Poland, for example, Polish and Lithuanian communities are inextricably intermingled. Who are the first comers and who are the immigrants it is futile to inquire since the condition antedates authentic records. No frontier, however sinuous, could dissect out the nationalities. Provision must therefore be made for their harmonious co-existence under the same national flag. There could be no harmony if either race were required to give up its language and customs. Nor is it essential to the health of the state. It is sufficient that one language be recognized as official and that the whole population should finally become familiar with it through public instruction. In an era of peace the presence of minority language communities will not only not be a handicap; it will be a decided source of strength. Poland will be able to maintain closer cultural relations with the surrounding states because she holds within her boundaries communities responding naturally to the life of those states. Commercial and industrial relations will likewise be more easily maintained.

The same principles applied to Czecho-Slovakia, Jugoslavia and Rumania should go far toward pacifying the Balkans. The Italians on the Dalmatian coast would have no very serious grievance if they were guaranteed by the League of Nations against forcible nationalization. The Germans and Magyars of Transylvania would learn to accommodate themselves to Rumanian rule if they knew that they would not be made into Rumanians against their will. History has shown that national interpenetration is the natural scheme of things in eastern Europe. In the Polish treaty this fact is given due recognition. That is a long step toward permanent peace.

No Where to No End

THE restoration of Russia is impossible until there has been a restoration of common sense throughout the world. It really is not possible to have a policy, to act with any dignity and effectiveness so long as we continue to live in a manufactured panic. We have not acted in Russia. We have dabbled in Russia. We have made war—a little bit. We have helped Kolchak—a little bit. We have negotiated with Lenin—a little bit. We have dismembered Russia—a little bit. But what we have done all the time is to dance around the edges of this continental empire making perfectly terrible faces at it. If ever there was a policy which deserved the scorn Mr. Roosevelt used to pour out upon the forcible-feeble it is our policy of trying at one and the same time to intervene and stay out, to crush the Bolsheviki and not to fight them, to help Kolchak and withdraw the troops, to recognize him and not to recognize him, to ask guarantees and be satisfied with half-hearted ones. It is an off-again-on-again-gone-again-Finnegan policy.

For this super-vacillation it is not possible to have any respect whatsoever. It might be possible to respect a policy which declared the Soviet government an enemy of the human race and made war against it. It would be infinitely more possible to respect a policy which said that the Russians must settle their own affairs. But a policy which consists in a ruthless blockade supplemented by subsidies to little dictatorships, all around the circumference of the Red Guard dictatorship, a policy of egging the other fellow on and letting him take the consequences, a policy of calling upon Russians to engage in civil war, and then deserting them, thank you, is nothing but down-right futility. But a war that is not a war, a dictatorship that is democratic, an invasion that protects the integrity of Russia is not honorable and not sense and no good to anybody.

The reason it is not sense is clear enough. Russian policy is not a reasoned conclusion from the facts. It is propaganda limited by the disgust of the peoples. The statesmen have encouraged a propaganda about which there could be but one conclusion if it were true—a war against Soviet Russia. But they do not dare to draw the conclusion, not simply because the people are weary of war, but because they will not fight that war. They won't fight it because they don't believe in it. Americans don't want to fight Russians, neither do Englishmen want to fight them, nor Frenchmen. They may think the Bolsheviki a bad lot, but what they don't see is why they were elected to cure them.

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For looking at Russia what do they behold? Two dictatorships. One at Moscow based on the Red Guard, one at Omsk based on Allied officers, conscripted Russians, and the Japanese. They know from the propaganda that the Moscow dictatorship is all atrocity and murder. They know from the same propaganda that the Omsk dictatorship is democracy, sweetness and light. They are asked to help one against the other. Then they notice that the Moscow regime with the whole world against it survives and advances, while the Omsk regime with the whole world for it, totters and retreats and cannot even govern Siberia. Naturally, they wonder why the Russian masses who taste the atrocities of Moscow and the blessings of Omsk don't all rally to Omsk as against Moscow. What seems to be clear as daylight to the editors in London, Paris and New York, seems not to be so clear in Russia. So the working classes of Europe are threatening strikes if Russia is not let alone.

And because of this threat the governments do not dare make war against Russia. But at the same time they do not dare not make war. They have got the investors and the employing classes so thoroughly frightened by propaganda that they have to dabble a little in war and speculate a great deal in counter-revolution in order to satisfy them. Russian policy is simply a compromise between the convictions of the European working classes and the European middle and upper classes. This compromise consists in "a sort of a war" on behalf of a semi-recognized provisional government by means of an intervention that does not intervene.

That is not the way healthy nations and healthy governments behave. And it is not in the least bit inspiring to see America entangled in the business. Surely the principles which ought to guide us are clear enough. The form of the Russian government and the form of Russian society must be determined by the Russians. They are at liberty to pick Lenin or Kolchak, Rasputin or the Tsar or Archibald Stevenson, if they like. We demand of them only that they respect their pledges to us, safeguard the rights of Americans, and cease all efforts to export their particular form of government. Until they have satisfied us on these points we cannot deal with them diplomatically. But beyond that we take no responsibility for what goes on in Russia. They are welcome to their experiment if they wish to pay the price. We have no intention of trying it. Deep wrong and inequalities we propose to remedy in a different way and in the interests of a different ideal. At the same time we have no intention of lying about Russia, or of poisoning our own life with the propaganda of the factions now contending for the body and soul of Russia. We shall protect ourselves from the propaganda of the old regime Russians by refusing to participate in their purposes, and from the propaganda of the Bolsheviks by democratic reform which will make us impervious to their ways of doing business, and to the ideal of society which they propose. And having done this we shall once again have Americanized our diplomacy.

The Thirst for Subsidy

OF all the bright dreams to which the American shipowner is subject, the dream of a benevolent government shielding him against competition and filling his coffers with the taxpayers' money, is perhaps the most enticing. During the war, when the German submarine was sending charter rates to ten times their normal level, and the government itself was paying for requisitioned ships five times the amount that they had been earning before, the yearning for subsidies was in abeyance. Now, however, it has come back, strong and insistent.

The yearning takes numerous forms, according to the angle of self-interest from which the matter is approached. The man who wants to buy a ship from the government has a vision of a conveniently flexible price—generally the lowest foreign cost of construction, payable in slow instalments, interest to be paid only if earned, and the ship to be revalued at intervals to give the purchaser the benefit of a drop in the market. The ship operator wants his costs "equalized," and his vision is all embracing.

Money is high; let the government loan it at three or four per cent. Wages are high; let the government enroll his seamen in the naval reserve and pay them out of the treasury, thus releasing the ship operator of part of the wage cost. Bunker fuel is expensive; let the government establish oil and coal stations all over the world. There are trades, not now profitable, which it will take years of persistent effort to build up; let the government set up a merchant marine development fund and pocket the deficits. Cargoes may become scarce, and the waters are full of competition; let the government reduce railroad freight rates and giant tariff differentials on goods carried in American bottoms.

The shipbuilder's vision is different from the shipowner's in only one respect: he does not want the government to swamp his market by selling its ships cheap. As far as the existing government owned merchant marine is concerned, he is for the

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present at least an advocate of government ownership. With respect to operation, the shipbuilder's and shipowner's visions blend into one. For the shipbuilder wants American shipping companies to continue building ships in his yards at American prices, government subsidies making good the cost of operating these high priced ships in the world market. Indeed the most brazen subsidy proposal that has been made in public has come from a well-known shipbuilder, the representative of the Atlantic Shipbuilders' Association, Mr. Joseph Powell. Speaking at the Shipping Board's recent merchant marine conference, Mr. Powell went so far as to advocate the use of government money to put "fighting ships" into trades in which foreign competition "required such methods." A "fighting ship" is a ship operated at a loss in a particular trade to drive out a competitor, so that rates can be raised again as soon as monopoly conditions are established. American courts have declared the use of "fighting ships" to be an illegal method of competition in violation of the Sherman law. Mr. Powell's unblushing suggestion that the government use this illegal instrument against foreign countries will come as a shock to the foreign readers of Mr. Wilson's international addresses and state papers.

Mr. Hurley and his majority on the Shipping Board also are not immune from the subsidy fever. Some time ago he broached a plan for the immediate sale at market prices to American purchasers of the whole government owned merchant marine. He has since sold a few ships, available for spot delivery, at high prices, because the wholly temporary condition of inflation in the freight market enables purchasers of spot tonnage to write off a large part of their purchase price in the first voyage.

But this month and the next between one and two million tons of shipping are going back to private trades from army and food relief service, and more than half a million tons of new construction are being delivered each month, so that the high market cannot last. For the future, shipowners and shipbuilders are largely agreed that the American market cannot absorb any large number of Mr. Hurley's ships, except at sacrifice prices. Rather than concede the inevitable failure of his plan, Mr. Hurley is trying to jack it up by offering various kinds of subsidy as bait to the purchasers. The merchant marine development fund, with its vague provisions for a sum of several millions annually available for undefined purposes of merchant marine development, was in his plan as originally announced. Since then he has given up government control of maximum rates and has added a postal subsidy and a naval reserve subsidy. Whether other subsidies are to come the public knows not.

It is time Congress put an end to this indulgence in an unwholesome craving for government aid. It is demoralizing beyond measure. If American shipping is to compete with the shipping of the world, it will be because American inventiveness and daring and genius for organization will devise a more efficient method of ship operation than our competitors. It can never compete if American daring and inventiveness exhausts itself in devising new and unusual forms of government subsidy. The subsidy vision is a mirage, for more reasons than one. It is a mirage because no Congress in its senses will appropriate a sufficient subsidy to materially affect the situation. It is a mirage because if Congress grants a subsidy at all, farmers and laborers will insist on getting their share of the pelf, and demand control of shipping rates and seamen's wages to their advantage. Finally it is a mirage because it is a game at which more than one can play. If we subsidize our shipping heartily, other nations will follow suit, thus soon counteracting any temporary competitive advantage our shipowners might derive.

The sound policy is the one urged by Commissioner Stevens in his recent minority report to Congress. The present is not the time for a forced sale of the government owned merchant fleet, even if by bargain counter prices and liberal subsidies the fleet could be sold. For the next five years or more the government must retain title to the great bulk of the tonnage, using its superior resources, aided by the best shipping talent of the country, in developing trade routes and building up American shipping companies. Shipping men will be wise if they devote their talents to this end, and drop for a while the vain pursuit of the subsidy mirage.

The New
REPUBLIC
A Journal of Opinion

PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1919, IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., 421 WEST TWENTY-FIRST STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. HERBERT CROLY, PRESIDENT, ROBERT HALLOWELL, TREASURER

EDITORS
HERBERT CROLY — FRANCIS HACKETT
PHILIP LITTELL — ALVIN JOHNSON
WALTER E. WEYL — WALTER LIPPMANN
CHARLES MERZ
SIGNE TOKSVIG, Assistant Editor

YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION FIFTY-TWO ISSUES, FIVE DOLLARS IN ADVANCE. SINGLE COPIES FIFTEEN CENTS. CANADIAN SUBSCRIPTION FIVE DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE. FOREIGN SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR COUNTRIES IN THE POSTAL UNION, SIX DOLLARS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE; REMITTANCE TO BE MADE BY INTERNATIONAL POSTAL MONEY ORDER.

ENTERED AS SECOND CLASS MATTER, NOVEMBER 6, 1914, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879.

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On the Two Sides of the Eastern Sea

IT is three days easy journey from Japan to China. It is doubtful whether anywhere in the world another journey of the same length brings with it such a complete change of political temper and belief. Certainly it is greater than the alteration perceived in journeying directly from San Francisco to Shanghai. The difference is not one in customs and modes of life; that goes without saying. It concerns the ideas, beliefs and alleged information current about one and the same fact: the status of Japan in the international world and especially its attitude toward China. One finds everywhere in Japan a feeling of uncertainty, hesitation, even of weakness. There is a subtle nervous tension in the atmosphere as of a country on the verge of change but not knowing where the change will take it. Liberalism is in the air, but genuine liberals are encompassed with all sorts of difficulties especially in combining their liberalism with the devotion to theocratic robes which the imperialistic militarists who rule Japan have so skilfully thrown about the Throne and the Government. But what one senses in China from the first moment is the feeling of the all-pervading power of Japan which is working as surely as fate to its unhesitating conclusion—the domination of Chinese politics and industry by Japan with a view to its final absorption.

It is not my object to analyze the realities of the situation or to inquire whether the universal feeling in China is a collective hallucination or is grounded in fact. The phenomenon is worthy of record on its own account. Even if it be merely psychological, it is a fact which must be reckoned with in both its Chinese and its Japanese aspects. And in the first place, as to the differences in psychological atmosphere. Everybody who knows anything about Japan knows that it is the land of reserves and reticences. The half-informed American will tell you that this is put on for the misleading of foreigners. The informed know that it is an attitude shown to foreigners only because it is deeply engrained in the moral and social tradition of Japan; and that, if anything, the Japanese are more likely to be communicative—about many things at least—to a sympathetic foreigner, than to one another. The habit of reserve is so deeply embedded in all the etiquette, convention and daily ceremony of living, as well as in the ideals of strength of character, that only the Japanese who have subjected themselves to foreign influences escape it—and many of them revert. To put it mildly, the Japanese are not a loquacious people; they have the gift of doing rather than of gab.

When accordingly a Japanese statesman or visiting diplomatist engages in unusually prolonged and frank discourse setting forth the aims and procedures of Japan, the student of politics who has been long in the East at once becomes alert, not to say suspicious. A recent illustration is so extreme that it will doubtless seem fantastic beyond belief. But the student at home will have to take these seeming fantasies seriously if he wishes to appreciate the present atmosphere of China. Cables have brought fragmentary reports of some addresses of Baron Goto in America. Doubtless in the American atmosphere these have the effect of reassuring America as to any improper ambitions on the part of Japan. In China, they were taken as announcements that Japan has about completed its plans for the absorption of China, and that the lucubration preliminary to operations of swallowing are about to begin. The reader is forgiven in advance any scepticism he feels about both the fact itself and the correctness of my report of the belief in the alleged fact. His scepticism will not surpass what I should feel in his place. But the suspicion aroused by such statements as this and the recent interview of Foreign Minister Uchida and Baron Ishii must be noted as evidences of the universal belief in China that Japan has one mode of diplomacy for the east and another for the West, and that what is said in the West must be read in reverse in the East.

China, whatever else it is, is not the land of privacies. It is a proverb that nothing long remains secret in China. The Chinese talk more easily than they act—especially in politics. They are adepts in revealing their own shortcomings. They dissect their own weaknesses and failures with the most extraordinary reasonableness. One of the defects upon which they dwell is the love of finding substitutes for positive action, of avoiding entering upon a course of action which might be irrevocable. One almost wonders whether their power of self-criticism is not itself another of these substitutes. At all events, they are frank to the point of loquacity. Between the opposite camps there are always communications flowing. Among official enemies there are "sworn friends." In a land of perpetual compromise, etiquette as well as necessity demands that the ways for later accommodations be kept open. Consequently things which are spoken of only under the breath in Japan

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are shouted from the housetops in China. It would hardly be good taste in Japan to allude to the report that influential Chinese ministers are in constant receipt of Japanese funds and these corrupt officials are the agencies by which political and economic concessions were wrung from China while Europe and America were busy with the war. But in China nobody even takes the trouble to deny it, or even to discuss it. What is psychologically most impressive is the fact that it is merely taken for granted. When it is spoken of, it is as one mentions the heat on an unusually hot day.

In speaking of the feeling of weakness current in Japan about Japan itself, one must refer to the economic situation because of its obvious connection with the international situation. In the first place, there is the strong impression that Japan is over-extended. Even in normal times, Japan relies more upon production for foreign markets than is regarded in most countries as safe policy. But there is the belief that Japan *must* do so, because only by large foreign sellings—large in comparison with the purchasing power of a people still having a low standard of life—can it purchase the raw materials—and even food—it has to have. But during the war, the dependence of manufacturing and trade at home upon the foreign market was greatly increased. The domestic increase of wealth, though very great, is still too much in the hands of the few to affect seriously the internal demand for goods. Item one which awakens sympathy for Japan as being in a somewhat precarious situation.

Another item concerns the labor situation. Japan seems to feel itself in a dilemma. If she passes even reasonably decent factory laws (or rather attempts their enforcement) and regulates child and women's labor, she will lose that advantage of cheap labor which she now counts on to offset her many disadvantages. On the other hand, strikes, labor difficulties, agitation for unions, etc., are constantly increasing, and the tension in the atmosphere is unmistakable. The rice riots are not often spoken of, but their memory persists, and the fact that they came very near to assuming a directly political aspect. Is there a race between fulfillment of the aspirations of the military clans who still hold the reins, and the growth of genuinely democratic forces which will forever terminate those aspirations? Certainly the defeat of Germany gave a blow to bureaucratic militarism in Japan which in time will go far. Will it have the time required to take effect on foreign policy? The hope that it will is a large factor in stimulating liberal sympathy for a Japan which is beginning to undergo the throes of transition.

As for the direct international situation of Japan, the feeling in Japan is one of the threatening danger of isolation. Germany is gone; Russia is gone. While those facts simplify matters for Japan somewhat, there is also the belief that in taking away potential allies, they have weakened Japan in the general game of balance and counterbalance of power. Particularly does the removal of imperialistic Russia relieve the threat on India which was such a factor in the willingness of Great Britain to make the offensive-defensive alliance. The revelation of the militaristic possibilities of America is another serious factor. Certainly the new triple entente cordiale of Japan, Italy and France is no adequate substitute for a realignment of international forces in which a common understanding between Great Britain and America is a dominant factor. This factor explains, if it does not excuse, some of the querulousness and studied discourtesies with which the Japanese press for some months has treated President Wilson, the United States in general and its relation to the League of Nations in particular, while it also throws light on the ardor with which the opportune question of racial discrimination was discussed. (The Chinese have an unfailing refuge in a sense of humor. It was interesting to note the delight with which they received the utterance of the Japanese Foreign Minister, after Japanese success at Paris, that "his attention had recently been called" to various press attacks on America which he much deprecated). In any case there is no mistaking the air of tension and nervous overstrain which now attends all discussion of Japanese foreign relations. In all directions, there are characteristic signs of hesitation, shaking of old beliefs and movement along new lines. Japan seems to be much in the same mood as that which it experienced in the early eighties before, toward the close of that decade, it crystallized its institutions through acceptance of the German constitution, militarism, educational system, and diplomatic methods. So that, once more, the observer gets the impression that substantially all of Japan's energy, abundant as that is, must be devoted to her urgent problems of readjustment.

Come to China, and the difference is incredible. It almost seems as if one were living in a dream; or as if some new Alice had ventured behind an international looking-glass wherein everything is reversed. That we in America should have little idea of the state of things and the frame of mind in China is not astonishing—especially in view of the censorship and the distraction of attention of the last few years. But that Japan and China should be so geographically near, and yet every fact that concerns them appear in precisely opposite perspective, is an experience of a life time. Japanese liberalism? Yes, it is heard of, but only in connection with one form which the longing for the

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miraculous *deus ex machina* takes. Perhaps a revolution in Japan may intervene to save China from the fate which now hangs over her. But there is no suggestion that anything less than a complete revolution will alter or even retard the course which is attributed to Japanese diplomacy working hand in hand with Japanese business interests and militarism. The collapse of Russia and Germany? These things only mean that Japan has in a few years fallen complete heir to Russian hopes, achievements and possessions in Manchuria, and Outer Mongolia, and has had opportunities in Siberia thrown into her hands which she could hardly have hoped for in her most optimistic moments. And now Japan has, with the blessing of the great Powers at Paris, become also the heir of German concessions, intrigues and ambitions, with added concessions, wrung (or bought) from incompetent and corrupt officials by secret agreements when the world was busy with war. If all the great Powers are so afraid of Japan that they give way to her every wish, what is China that she can escape the doom prepared for her? That is the cry of helplessness going up all over China. And Japanese propagandists take advantage of the situation, pointing to the action of the Peace Conference as proof that the Allies care nothing for China, and that China must throw herself into the arms of Japan if she is to have any protection at all. In short, Japan stands ready as she stood ready in Korea to guarantee the integrity and independence of China. And the fear that the latter must, in spite of her animosity toward Japan, accept this fate in order to escape something worse swims in the sinister air. It is the exact counterpart of the feeling current among the liberals in Japan that Japan has alienated China permanently when a considerate and slower course might have united the two countries. If the economic straits of Japan are alluded to, it is only as a reason why Japan has hurried her diplomatic coercion, her corrupt and secret bargainings with Chinese traitors and her industrial invasion. While the western world supposes that the military and the industrial party in Japan have opposite ideas as to best methods of securing Japanese supremacy in the East, it is the universal opinion in China that they two are working in complete understanding with one another, and the differences that sometimes occur between the Foreign Office in Tokyo and the Ministry of War (which is extra-constitutional in status) are staged for effect.

These are some of the aspects of the most complete transformation scene that it has ever been the lot of the writer to experience. May it turn out to be only an extraordinary psychological experience! But in the interests of truth it must be recorded that every resident of China, Chinese or American, with whom I have talked in the last four weeks has volunteered the belief that all the seeds of a future great war are now deeply implanted in China. To avert such a calamity they look to the League of Nations or some other force outside the immediate scene. Unfortunately the press of Japan treats every attempt to discuss the state of opinion in China or the state of facts as evidence that America, having tasted blood in the war, now has its eyes on Asia with the expectation later on of getting its hands on Asia. Consequently America is interested in trying to foster ill-will between China and Japan. If the pro-American Japanese do not enlighten their fellow-countrymen as to the facts then America ought to return some of the propaganda that visits its shores. But every American who goes to Japan ought also to visit China—if only to complete his education.

Nanking, May 28. JOHN DEWEY.

The Ride

IT was night in the late fall. Noiselessly the car slipped through the city, and, following its powerful lights, left the streets behind.

Sitting in the front I peered up the unwinding road, lured by the fascination and mystery of that which always lies just beyond the lights.

On and on, over the hills, down over a bridge. Sound of the rush of a brook.

On through the cold of a deep forest.

Always and forever the road stretches on.

The air is cold and sharp with frost, and hangs still.

I look around. How silent, how frozen is the moonlit country.

The hills stretching up sweep across the sky.

And the trees stand like statues against the horizon.

Do they look into another world? Do they guard an immense and wonderful treasure; still and cold in the night?

The brooks, with glitter of moonbeams and a rush, disappear into the darkness.

What worlds of silent forest and meadows they traverse!

Deep in that forest is a fairy land.

Shafts of moonlight find their way to soft sweet spots of moss; and long-lashed, soft-eyed deer roam silently over the moonlight patterns, and rest in the shadow of a tree.

The beauty of it goes through me like a stab of pain.

I breathe deep of the icy air, and leaning back look far into the heavens.

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How vast! Beyond my understanding.

My spirit becomes lost.

Ah, to be a part of all this bigness!

To give my very soul to it! And I pray:

That I may always see and feel the beauty of a night; the vastness of the heavens:

That I may always know that I, a human being, am part of this beauty, this immensity:

That I may live as purely, as intensely, as vastly as this night.

That I may not fall before the little things, the petty human troubles; but always strive and yearn, till my heart may become a part of the mystery of a moonlight night like this.

EDITH BASS.

The Big Country

I THINK of a country of immense space and immense silence.

A country of deserts vast as the seas, of mountains lost in the clouds, of forests, deep and dark, with trees so mighty that one can not see their tops.

A country so big that one's being becomes lost, a country so beautiful, so masterful, so infinite that only those who worship it and have the courage and the yearning to lose their souls in its wonder can rest there in peace. The timid, the small of heart must return to their cities, where closed in by walls and noises they need not see the sweep of its bigness nor suffer the pain of its beauty.

Most of all I dream of the desert with the sweet coolness of the morning, the burning ardor of the mid-day when the air shimmers with heat and every living thing lies still as death in meagre spots of shade.

I think of the ponies who hour after hour, to the music of the creaking saddle and the thud of a hoof, push on to the horizon. True sons of the desert are these ponies, and in their wise, indifferent eyes lurks a curious look of distance.

Now the sun sinks to the horizon line, and lies there like a big red ball.

A coolness and a soft wind creeps over the space, and with it myriad sounds.

Crickets, fluttering wings, and even the song of a nightingale. Sweet perfumes of flowers scent the air. Flowers that bloom and die in a night, but concentrate all the sweetness and beauty of a lifetime in those few hours.

Night on the desert is wild and full of romance. The wind grows stronger, and hurrying close to the ground seems like a living thing.

A lone coyote travels across the desert, screaming and crying as he goes.

The dogs moan and twitch in their sleep, and the cactus rustles and creaks in the wind.

A great peace pervades me. I am no longer a human being with all the petty troubles, regrets and yearnings, but safely, mysteriously, I seem to be lost in a mighty soul, and my heart rests.

And the night is a part of me.

EDITH BASS.

The Task for Americans

LOOKED at casually and from the outside, our work for the future is very neatly and with tolerable completeness cut out for us. It consists in fitting the late arrivals into our midst to the terms and conditions of American life. That here is a pressing need, that herein we have a duty and an opportunity, there can be no question. However democratic you and I may be, however keen our misgivings may be at the prospect of a dead uniformity artificially induced, the sheer prosperity and welfare of the stranger himself, to say nothing of the continued unity of our common life, demand and justify a degree of interference. There is a level below which entire self-management is not to be had, and insistence upon it is mere ideology. Infants must be fed and guided, regardless of their fathers' views about self-determination; and inside a given period the outlander shares the rawness and helplessness of childhood, though without sharing its privileges and immunities. Before it is possible for him to decide on the quality and the adequacy of the machinery which we have installed in our national household, before he can even take a hand in the running of it, he will have to make its acquaintance.

It is for us to facilitate the readjustment of the alien to his new life. We are the stalwart, adventurous elder sons of the European family who braved the wilderness and blazed the trail. Now the time has come for the youngsters and the old folks to follow us, and of course we will give them whatever of our experience may be of help to them. There can be no two opinions on that. But, emphatically, *facilitate* is the word. The problem of making Americans out of the newer immigrants is not our problem. It is the newcomer who has to learn, at the cost of no end of humiliation, that postage stamps are sold in drug stores, that shopkeepers do not haggle, that eggs sell by the dozen and walnuts by the pound. It is he who has to find his way about in alien streets and alien laws and usages. And it is he, not we, who must master the oddities and absurdities of a strange tongue whilst his mind is taken up with the struggle for a livelihood at fantastic trades. Happily he has us to advise and to guide him. We can read the signposts on the corner and interpret them to him. We were born to the speech and the manner, and with

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due patience and intelligence and good-will we may perhaps convey some share of our knowledge to him. It happens to be to our interest that he shall not be maimed, that he shall not lapse into crime, that he shall not spread contagion; therefore we can well afford the cost of keeping him informed about our institutions and their pitfalls. But all this, which we benevolently worry over as our Americanization Problem is not, obviously, America's problem at all. As far as Americanizing the foreigner goes the burden is chiefly the foreigner's, and it is America in fact that constitutes his problem.

I believe with all my heart that the teaching of English to the late comers is wholly desirable, and, in a sense, even fundamental. It is of the utmost importance that peoples of various origins living side by side shall agree on some common medium of communication, as a first step toward mutual understanding. But teaching English is, except technically, no sort of a problem. It is entirely a matter of time and the proper instrument. America wants the foreigner to learn English, and the foreigner wants to learn it; and there is an end to the difficulty. There is no reason why the continental immigrant should not want to acquire our speech; and there is every reason why he should. Had the language of America, by some historical mishap, been German or Magyar, or even French, its acceptance by Poles or Slovaks even on this side of the water might indeed have been problematical. But English lies luckily outside the area of European animosity. The positive advantages, moreover, to the stranger of knowing the speech of the land are the strongest arguments in its favor. He must have it in order to prosper in his business, and in his dealings with the native, as well as for communication with other foreign groups. In addition, English is one of the great world languages of culture, and the more intelligent foreigner embraces the opportunity of learning it as a gateway which opens up the treasures of a splendid literature. It needs, therefore, no clever propaganda to induce him to accept it. We have only to put the facilities in his way, and, if our industrial arrangements leave him the needed leisure and energy, he will, we may rest assured, avail himself of them.

But the Anglicanization of the immigrant, and indeed his complete readjustment to American life, does not even touch the fringes of the problems in hand. The task before us is of quite another sort. What confronts America is the need of convincing the newer peoples of the genuineness and sincerity of her mission and her professions. You may give the alien evening schools and continuation schools; you may teach his wife in the home and his daughter in the factory; you may flood him with reprints of the Declaration of Independence and the speeches of Lincoln; and when you have finished, you will be no farther along the road of winning his heart and his cooperation than when you began. I say winning advisedly; because, that, as I see it, is distinctly *our* problem. To readjust himself to the American environment is the task for the immigrant, and no one can do it for him. But it is the first principle of hospitality to clean house thoroughly when guests are coming. Only so can the impression we make upon him be both effective and lasting.

The task is not for the propagandist. It is for the statesman and the whole American people. We will have to abandon our deep-rooted notion that public opinion is formed by the editorial column and the movie sermon. The immigrant pieces out his picture of America not by what the paragrapher and Mr. Creel tell him on the sixteenth page of the newspaper, but by the accounts of actual happenings which he finds on the front page. Above all he gains his impressions, just as we all do, by his own personal contacts with the life about him. The alien may be dumb, but we are in error when we suppose that he is also deaf and blind. He is quite competent to distinguish between news and advertisement.

It is all too easy for us to tell him that the American tradition is for freedom of conscience, but he knows that actually some of our gentlest citizens are pining in prison for the sake of their consciences. The propagandist may din it into his ears that America believes in law and order and the freedom of expression, but from the very same newspaper which carries the dope of the official information bureau he learns (on the news side of the sheet) that lawless mobs in uniform have broken up meetings and violated free speech, and nothing said or done. He would far more readily give credence to our protestations anent the sanctity of childhood if we could prevent the news from reaching him that our Supreme Court has declared the child sweating law unconstitutional. And he would have the implicit faith in the fairness and democratic temper of our public education which we are asking him to have, if we summarily exiled Mr. Tildsley to that Prussia which inspires him.

Our business, in very brief, is to live up to our character and to our promises. It is of no earthly use to distribute the Gospel among the heathen, unless our lives are sufficiently Christian to tally with Gospel principles. It only makes matters worse. It invites attention to the glaring contrast between practice and profession. It is by the tradition of the Fathers that we attempt to gain converts to our polity, and as long as we fail to live by that tradition, the sole effect of our sermons is

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to lay us open, in the eyes of our new neighbors, to the charge of backsliding. Wherefore, until the time comes when we can square our conduct with our book, it would be the part of wisdom to keep the book locked away on our shelves.

For the European immigrant expects a great deal of us, both in consequence of his own development in the past century and because of his too literal credence in our protestations. In the past century Europe has traveled far in the path of democracy—vastly farther than we ever suspect. While America was busy clearing a continent, the Old World was making a terrific struggle for freedom. While Europe was passing through the upheaval of '48, America was having her '49. This divergence during a hundred years of progress is, I believe, at the root of the misunderstanding between the European who migrated to America in the eighteenth century and his cousin who followed him hither in the nineteenth. And there will never be any modus vivendi between the two until that gulf is somehow bridged. The American of today still thinks of democracy as his great-grandfather thought of it—as a detached political ideal above the life of every day. The recent European immigrant associates democracy with his actual daily life—an affair of bread and butter and the schooling of his children and the roof over his head. And the gap which separates him from his preaching neighbor is widened still more by his realization that America's nationalization problem, like all problems of its kind since the children of Jacob built pyramids for the Pharaohs, consists principally in the irritation generated at the points of contact between employer and employee. It is he, the foreigner, who is, broadly, the employee, and his American employer seems to attempt a solution, in the traditional manner, by homily when nothing but deeds and a spirit of cooperation will suffice.

What we have to do is, therefore, clear enough. It is not, as the now popular phrase has it, that we must Americanize the Americans. It is much more than that. Before the immigrant can be won over, we must Americanize America herself. We must lift American institutions and American practice to the high plane of America's own traditions. We must come to look upon the immigrant as he is, a boon to us and an equal, instead of a nuisance and an uninvited invader. And we must somehow meet his ideal of us and our country by fashioning them in the mould of the ideals and the aspirations of the twentieth century. When we have done this much, life itself will take care of the future. For America is still very much in the making, and it will require the energy and the goodwill and the traditions of all the peoples of the earth, working together, to make her what she started out to be, a greater and a freer and a nobler Europe.

This, at least, is how I view the much discussed Americanization Problem; and I am but one of many citizens who have been made into Americans out of immigrant material, and who have had such a struggle in the face of recent events to stay made. The question in our minds is whether America has saved enough of the spirit of democratic fellowship and idealism out of the consuming fire and destruction of two years of war to approach her great task in the manner worthy of her splendid past.

M. E. RAVAGE.

Anti-Bolsheviks: The Up-Rollers

NOT to be behind my fellow-citizens in the labors of the moment, I have thought up a Bolshevik propaganda investigation of my own, which I claim will be more inquisitional than any of the others. My idea is to take this Bolshevik propaganda and split it into its two manifest parts of pro-Bolshevik and anti-Bolshevik and then test both parts, relatively, by personal results. I begin by addressing a questionnaire to all United States Senators, as follows:

"1. To what extent has pro-Bolshevik propaganda made you believe that Bolshevism is a good thing and that the people of Russia yearn for it and love it?

"2. To what extent, on the other hand, did anti-Bolshevik Propaganda make you see vast masses of anti-Bolshevik Russians 'rolling up' against Lenin for the purpose of replacing Lenin's government with a government more democratic? Describe your feelings when you observed that these anti-Bolshevik Russians were rolling up in the manner more of a caterpillar than of a snowball. Describe your feelings further when you started trying to dig out the democratic home-town election records of Kolchak and Denikin and when you noticed that Tchaikowsky's anti-Bolshevik 'Government of the North' in the Archangel District was not really Russian at all but essentially just as British as the British government of India. Compare the self-government you were told there would be in anti-Bolshevik Russia with the Cossack government and the foreign government there actually is.

"3. Of these two sorts of propaganda, pro-Bol-

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shevik and anti-Bolshevik, which sort really gulled you?"

I am frank to say that the one that gulled me was the anti-Bolshevik one; and if "Hell has no fury like a woman scorned," certainly earth has no sorer citizen than a propagandee waked up.

This up-rolling began first to be published on a great scale in the middle of 1918. It was published as a sort of folk-movement, up from the depths, altogether native and spontaneous. It is still so published, at times.

Mr. Spargo, in his book on Bolshevism, on page 253, describes the up-rollers at Jaroslav. In July of 1918 they rolled up as hard as they could against Bolshevik tyranny. Yes. But is that all there was in it? Mr. Spargo uses just one word which might be taken to indicate that he is conscious that in fact there was indeed something more in it. He says that the "insurrection" at Jaroslav "originally arose from the suppression of the Soviet and of other popular assemblages" at Jaroslav by the Bolsheviks. "Originally." It was a local thing "originally." Perhaps, then, later, it was also something else. But what? Mr. Spargo does not say.

I have to proceed to summon Colonel Lebedeff. He would be peculiarly interesting to Senators. He actually up-rolled, and afterwards he came to America and wrote a book—vehemently anti-Bolshevik—urging Americans to come on to the Volga and up-roll against Lenin themselves. He needed company, and his book proves it.

On page 11 of this book—which is the most ingenuously written and most carelessly edited of all books of propaganda I have ever seen—we learn that Allied diplomats, early in 1918, entered into "official negotiations" with various groups of Russians who were planning an anti-Soviet revolt. These diplomats, one has to remember, were living in Soviet Russia and were claiming diplomatic personal immunity and security from the Soviet government. They were guests, and they claimed to be guests and insisted on being so treated. When Soviet officials, without Lenin's knowledge, arrested the Rumanian Minister, these diplomats indignantly demanded—and secured—his release. They were sticklers for immunity—without reciprocity. They demanded sacred security for their persons from the Soviet government and simultaneously (as Colonel Lebedeff's book amply shows) they encouraged and they guided a civil war against that government—that government which was their claimed host.

(Here I would summon, just for a moment, a distinctly low person, but an expert—Count von Bernstorff.)

The Allied participation in the origin of the anti-Bolshevist up-rolling in Russia may have helped to make it popular in Britain and France. It could not help to make it popular in Russia. The Russian leadership of the up-rolling was necessarily confined to such Russians as were willing to enter into surreptitious dealings with foreigners.

Proceeding onward with such Russians in Colonel Lebedeff's book, we come in time to Mr. Spargo's specimen town of Jaroslav. On page 25 we learn that "The Allies advised the Officers' Organizations to revolt simultaneously against the Bolsheviki in Ribinsk, Vladimir, Jaroslav and Murom." The Officers' Organizations thereupon revolted accordingly.

It was a foreign idea, then, as well as a Russian idea, and it was foreign influence as well as Russian influence that produced the spontaneous insurrection at Jaroslav.

However, there it was—that insurrection. Jaroslav was free. It was free to up-roll through all its streets. Why then did it succumb to the Bolsheviks in a fortnight? Or, rather, more generally, why was it that these up-rollers, having captured Jaroslav, and having captured a great many other towns on the Volga line, and having liberated their populations, and having (above all) secured the active assistance of the Czechoslovaks, were soon surrendering town after town back to the Bolsheviks and were beaten clear off the Volga line by a Red army which at that time was in its earliest and crudest stage of organization?

Because, as Colonel Lebedeff over and over again explicitly says, the Allied troops, though promised, did not come. In other words, the up-rollers, by themselves, were a very scanty and a very feeble folk.

But, again, why? At the start of Colonel Lebedeff's book the up-rolling is fine. Everybody wants to do it. What happens to it? Why is it that by the time we come to page 17 the leaders of the up-rolling, in liberated territory, have to get their recruits by conscription "in view of the fact that it was feared that voluntary enlistments might not bring the desired results?" Why is it that finally on page 34 they have to say that "in a last attempt to crush the enemy, with great effort we succeeded in bringing together a number of men, about enough for a regiment"? Why one regiment? Why not at least a couple of army corps, in some proportion to the popular enthusiasm of pages one to 16?

On this point Colonel Lebedeff makes his mysterious country more mysterious than ever, particularly in the matter of the paymaster part of Russian military operations.

On page 30 Colonel Lebedeff reports the capture of much gold from the Bolsheviks at Kazan.

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There is no doubt that the capture happened, and there is no doubt that the gold was indeed much. It amounted, as the introduction of Colonel Lebedeff's book explains, to $400,000,000. It was two-thirds of Russia's whole gold reserve. Having captured this gold, the "People's Army"—the up-rollers' army—goes down to defeat before "numerous hordes of Bolsheviki."

Colonel Lebedeff does not mind reporting these "numerous hordes." They might perhaps arouse a suspicion in the reader's mind—a suspicion that some Russians liked to fight Colonel Lebedeff; but Colonel Lebedeff lays that suspicion to rest. These hordes are simply hired hordes. The Bolsheviks are rich. The Bolsheviks, "with large sums of money at their disposal," says Colonel Lebedeff bitterly, "could easily find mercenaries."

Once more the Bolsheviks are the wicked magicians and the anti-Bolsheviks are the blubbering innocents. Colonel Lebedeff and his friends, with $400,000,000 in their pockets, are just as poor as they ever were, and Lenin can bribe more people with one-third of the gold reserve than they can with two-thirds.

I sometimes think that the Allies ought to fire all the Russians they are now using in Russia and simply go and buy that man Lenin. They have said he is buyable; and he certainly can get more soldiers with less real money and outfit more regiments with less imported material and generally make more bricks with less straw than any of our Russians; and if he would give up Bolshevism, now that the Kaiser is gone, I would let him name his own price. At any price he would be cheaper than gentlemen who find $400,000,000 and cannot get it changed to any use on the Volga and send it, as Colonel Lebedeff narrates, all the way back to Omsk—to Omsk, where Kolchak now rolls up and almost dies for lack of money and keeps calling to us faintly but urgently for loans, loans.

The trouble seems to be that the Allies, instead of getting Lenin into their employ, get themselves into his.

With the permission of the Senators I would here summon Dr. John Rickman, M.A., M.B., B.C., obviously of England. He saw the anti-Bolshevik up-rollers of 1918 with his own eyes. I quoted last week his description of their atrocities in the Buzuluk department and of their violently undemocratic curtailments of the right to vote. He then goes on to describe their obligation of the former Bolshevik control of private trade and their restoration of "free" trading, which resulted in sending the necessaries of life to such prices that "only the rich could buy." He then observes that it is not surprising that after three months the anti-Bolsheviks should have been forced to retire because of "grave discontent among the people." "Faced with the alternative of Bolshevism or of a government which they considered both oppressive and reactionary," the people, says Dr. Rickman, preferred Bolshevism.

It must have been pretty difficult to make them prefer Bolshevism. It must have been pretty difficult to make them want to go back to a rule which is undeniably and admittedly a dictatorship and undeniably and admittedly, whenever circumstances so require, a sanguinary dictatorship. This feat, however, Dr. Rickman tells us was accomplished. He is a man of highly respectable standing, a representative of a highly respectable war-relief society. In pursuance of my idea of studying anti-Bolshevism as well as Bolshevism, I would summon him.

I would then lay on the table, in front of the Senators, some seven tons of cable dispatches and other documents assuring us all this time that the up-rolling against Bolshevism is, and always has been, an up-rolling by and for the cause of democracy in Russia. I would suggest that we owe somebody a bill for that kind of instruction and that we try somehow to pay it.

I would then rapidly (for six or seven weeks) run through the subsequent history of Russian anti-Bolshevism, so far as we can gather it from first-hand witnesses, favorable and unfavorable; and the Senators might inquire: Why are the prospective up-rollings always so massive and the present up-rollings always so meager? And they might begin to suspect that the reason is the same reason which existed on the Volga in 1918. Whereupon, toward the end, after having summoned Dr. Rossett for Siberia, I would summon Nicholas Tchaikowsky for his own "Government of the North."

This is a peculiar government. It is unique among anti-Bolshevik governments. It is headed by a democrat. Out of the multitudinous waves of Russian anti-Bolshevism the Allies have been able to fish out one government, one, headed by a democrat—that is, by a man who never in his life before was a democrat.

But Tchaikowsky perhaps got his democracy too early in life to suit present Allied needs. Those death-bed democrats Kolchak and Denikin, who never were democrats when the Tsar was well and who now propose to be democrats only in Russia's next life, after a future and problematic Constitutional Convention, are much more suitable. They are vassals of the Allies; but, within their vassalship they seem to have a certain autonomy. Tchaikowsky, our democratic solitaire, is apparently less fortunate.

Tchaikowsky welcomes the Allies to his ports; and the Allies say that what they want in Russia is

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self-government for Russians; and they promise, repeatedly, that they will leave all Russian self-government scrupulously alone; and then, the war being over, a competently non-Bolshevik newspaper, the Chicago Tribune, sends a decidedly non-Bolshevik correspondent, Mr. Frazier Hunt, to the Government of the North; and Mr. Hunt proceeds to report what he finds.

I have seen him since he got back and I find that he is indeed altogether non-Bolshevik and that he is wholly simply American. I would summon him.

Mr. Hunt finds that the authority of the Government of the North is located not in Tchaikowsky's office but in British General Headquarters. He finds that Russian ministers in the Government of the North are put in and pulled out and changed around by direct British foreign influence. He finds that the Allies are exercising local police power—the first power and final symbol of all government. He finds that they are censoring local thought in local newspapers through censors in British uniforms. He finds them censoring that thought when it is not Bolshevik at all. He finds them arresting local Russian officials who are not in any way Bolshevik but only too "radical" for military-intelligence foreign officers. He finds them once arresting a whole Zemstvo—Zemstvos being precisely the local anti-Bolshevik governing bodies which presumably we went to Russia to protect from violence.

Mr. Hunt finds that the Russians in the Government of the North are not pleased. He finds that "there is no enthusiasm, even among intelligent Russians to assist the Allies." He finds that there was the customary anticipation of a deluge of "loyal" Russians rolling up to support an anti-democratic and foreign enterprise. Several hundred British officers arrived to train these up-rollers. Then, after four months of British occupation, and of a population of 300,000, "only a couple of thousand" of fighting Russian troops could be recruited; and among these troops, from time to time, there were mutinies.

Such is the latest up-rolling actually reported out of European Russia by an American who actually saw it. Yet the propaganda of up-rollings, and the propaganda of the democratic character of Allied intervention in Russia, continues. It continues especially out of the offices of the so-called Russian Information Bureau of the so-called Russian Embassy in the United States. From that office, at vast expense, comes a large part of the dope which sends us on in Russia in a dream. I will therefore next summon our arch-anti-Bolshevik propagandist, the head of the so-called Russian Information Bureau, Mr. A. J. Sack.

WILLIAM HARD.

Allied Policy Towards Russia

THE probable consequence of persisting in the present policy of economic isolation and military aggression for the purpose of bringing about the overthrow of Bolshevist government in Russia and Hungary are indicated by recent developments at Riga. On May 7th it was reported from reliable sources that the local Bolshevist authorities, being unable to provide foodstuffs, were mobbed by the populace and withdrew entirely from the city, which was given over to complete anarchy resulting in the wholesale massacre and murder of the so-called bourgeois population.

By continuing the present military and economic measures the Allies are, as they intend, undermining Bolshevist authority, but instead of producing or laying the basis for enlightened order, they are forcing Russia into the most disastrous and tragic circumstances possible to human society. In the circumstances of extreme privation and hunger coupled with the collapse of Bolshevist authority, the Russian proletariat will show more brutal animosity towards the bourgeois classes than it has hitherto felt or been permitted to indulge under Soviet rule. Before continuing with such a policy the Allies should pause to reflect and to realize that they are about to produce this unparallelled tragedy, and that, practically speaking, they are without any effective means of relieving the situation once they have produced it, or of directing Russia's development out of such conditions by a course which will lead neither to monarchist and reactionary autocracy on the one hand nor Bolshevist autocracy on the other. It seems altogether probable that such a state of anarchy would be followed, first, by a sanguinary autocracy under Kolchak and then, by a Bolshevist autocracy out of which would ultimately emerge sane and practical institutions precisely as they would emerge from the present regime if the Associated governments did not stand in the way. As it is, the people are forced by the Allied policy to choose between Bolshevist rule and Kolchak and so far they have preferred Bolshevist rule with all its disadvantages to the return of the old regime.

The reported events at Riga have served to illustrate an already evident fact, namely, that Bolshevism, crude and unjust as it is, represents a certain amount of social stability and protection of life. It is merely the political system which is natural to the first stage in the process of economic exhaustion which was started by the war and is being steadily advanced by the Allied policy of blockade and military encirclement. The next stage, which appears to have been reached at Riga, is seen to be incomparably more disastrous. The Associated governments face a solemn responsibility. They must find a justification for driving 180,000,000 helpless and innocent people into this second stage of anarchy, massacre, starvation and disease. Soon after the signature of peace with Germany, the Russian question will fall into sharp relief and facts will have to be produced and questions answered. The world will not tolerate nor forgive well-

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meaning misjudgment by those who persist in the present policy after notice of its appalling consequences.

The war has accustomed the mind to national policy costing enormously in human life and suffering. Perhaps it has calloused the minds of some who are responsible for the present Russian policy. Nevertheless, it is believed that sober reflection will convince the most calloused that in the nature of political and social development no conceivable circumstances, much less any which actually exist, could justify the continuation of a policy which is destined to reproduce the events at Riga in every city in Russia.

The justification which is offered for the present Russian policy is that it is necessary to save Russia and the rest of the world from Bolshevism.

There are five separately adequate answers to this claim of justification.

(1) The proposed remedy is wholly inefficacious and will stimulate, aggravate and prolong the disease it is intended to cure.

(2) Even though the prescribed remedy could be considered effective for western Europe and America its consequences are obviously more disastrous for Russia than Bolshevism itself, and there is no principle of justice upon which Russia can be required to undergo such extremes of misfortune in order that the working class of other countries will not be tempted into Bolshevism.

(3) The proposed remedy is wrong upon principle in that it is an attempt to combat by starvation and military measures the acceptance and circulation of unsound ideas, and to coerce the Russian people by these measures in the settlement of their own internal institutions.

(4) Bolshevism can be successfully combated and rendered impotent by any nation that is willing to commit itself liberally to the progressive adoption of democratic principles in its institutions and does not persist in the retention of demonstrable abuses.

(5) The present policy is jeopardizing the valuable fruits of the Russian Revolution and if successful will establish a reactionary government, probably monarchist in form which will suppress liberty and democracy in Russia until overthrown.

The essential fact about Bolshevism is that it is a challenge to the present leadership of the western nations. An appeal is being made to the working classes to repudiate and abandon the orderly methods afforded for the reform of existing institutions and to overthrow these institutions by force. Whatever may be the objections to these institutions and whatever may be the measures by which they are to be reformed, it must be clear that the outstanding necessity of the next few years is that the working classes shall retain, or, at least not wholly lose, their faith in existing governments and in the possibility of attaining justice and a democratic order without violence. Accordingly, it is essential that the present policy of the Associated Powers towards Russia, as in other matters, shall be such as to allay class animosity and confirm the faith of the people in the workability and adaptability of existing institutions—in progress according to law. Only in this way can the charges of Bolshevist propagandists be invalidated and rendered ineffective. Bolshevism is not Lenin and Trotsky, nor even Russia—it is sociological. Bolshevist authority in Russia may be completely overturned and at the same time and by the same measures Bolshevist sentiment may be enormously increased and intensified all over the world.

While economic exhaustion does produce Bolshevism, the Bolshevist problem cannot be dealt with merely as a disease attendant upon distressing economic conditions. Bolshevist doctrines, however false and unfair in some important respects, represent a protest against, and an attempt to remedy, an economic and social order that has operated unjustly upon the working class and is contrary in many fundamental respects to essential principles of democracy. This fact should be recognized by the Allied leaders as it is recognized by the average of people generally. This fact, together with the war weariness of the people of the Allied countries and their strong feeling that there is no justification for a war against the Russian Soviet government, makes it impossible for the Associated governments to place in Russia military forces sufficient to overthrow the present government and set up a republic and social order of the precise character they would like to deal with. This fact makes it practically certain that no government established by Kolchak will be tolerated for long by the Russian people.

It is the thought behind the present Allied policy that if the Soviet government, through failure to provide food, is finally overturned, the Russian people as well as the rest of the people of Europe and America will see in this collapse and spectacle of helpless misery, the complete and lasting indictment of Bolshevism. Following this collapse Kolchak will come into power; a government friendly to the Allies and welcoming the development of Russian resources by Allied capital will be established.

It is necessary to consider this policy upon two hypotheses: one, that it will result in the overthrow of Bolshevist authority, and, two, that it will not.

(1) Suppose the Lenin government is overthrown and Kolchak comes into power. What then? Will the working class of Russia, who have undergone this suffering, attribute it to the incompetency of their working-class leaders, or will they attribute it to the Associated governments? It seems foolhardy to suppose that it will be possible for the Associated governments to escape responsibility for the conditions which have been produced in part by their economic and military measures.

It should be appreciated that in a country where hundreds of thousands are dying each month from starvation and consequent disease there is enough "economic failure" to discredit the Allies as well as the Bolsheviki. The responsibility is joint and while it is plain that the Allies are already incurring, and will in future more certainly incur, profound and widespread resentment for their part in causing death and suffering on such a scale, the Bolshevists may succeed for a while in convincing the working classes of Russia and other countries that their policies are thoroughly sound and would have succeeded brilliantly if they had not been compelled, after starting with an economically exhausted country, to overcome a prolonged blockade and military aggression as well.

The Associated governments will also be held responsible for supporting Kolchak, and for the conditions which ensue when Kolchak comes into power. How will the working classes of the western nations look upon the measures he will be forced to employ to maintain his government? Allied leaders must face now with a balanced imagination the prospect of wholesale massacres which responsible persons familiar with Russia say will unquestionably take place.

Under existing circumstances it appears very unlikely that Bolshevism will be discredited in western Europe or suppressed in Russia by a collapse of the Lenin government. It will be terrorized temporarily in Russia, but the measures employed respectively by the Associated governments and Kolchak are very likely to arouse deep indigna-

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tion and revolutionary hatred among the working classes throughout Europe. At the same time Bolshevist missionaries will be armed with the most effective propaganda by which to spread their views and discredit the Associated governments as exponents of democracy and the right of peoples to self-determination. The Bolshevists can say with all the force of simple truth that the Associated governments, in violation of principles of democracy and self-determination, have attempted, by starvation and military measures, to coerce the Russian people in the settlement of their own internal institutions. As for Bolshevism in Russia, it seems unlikely that a Kolchak government, probably monarchist in form, could survive. The Russian masses must have gained a sense of power and a determination to exercise it, in consequence of which no government such as Kolchak will establish can survive. Since such a government would afford the people no orderly method of exerting their power and establishing liberty and just conditions, they would be forced again to revolution and under the circumstances it would probably be a Bolshevist revolution—leaving again the situation which at present confronts Russia.

By assisting a reactionary government to power in Russia the Associated governments are postponing for a long period the day when Bolshevism will be finally discredited and succeeded in Russia by a genuinely democratic order, a development which can only occur, and at the same time is certain to occur, as soon as the political atmosphere is so cleared that it will be plain to the Russian people that their continued economic ills are not attributable to foreign opposition but are due to Bolshevist incompetency and unsound organization.

(2) Suppose Kolchak fails and is swallowed up like so many of his predecessors in the great stream of forces which have been let loose in Russia by the Revolution. Recent reverses for his troops in Siberia indicate that this event may not be far distant. Other more permanent factors indicate a similar fate ultimately. Whatever may be the final attitude of the Russian people towards Bolshevist policy and methods, they know the paramount present necessity is to defeat Kolchak and prevent the re-establishment of the old order. Kerensky, appreciating this necessity, has come to Paris to urge the Associated governments to abandon their intervention. For the same reason the leaders of the Menshevist and more moderate revolutionary parties have assured American representatives in Russia within two months that they will put their entire strength behind the Bolshevist resistance if Admiral Kolchak really threatens to succeed. It is not then in the smallest degree an unlikely supposition that he will fail.

Now that peace is agreed upon with Germany the Allies will be in an even worse position than at present to carry on large military operations in Russia. No one can doubt that it will be the policy of Germany to effect a firm alliance with Russia and it seems unlikely that German leaders will allow their hostility to Bolshevist principles to deter them from doing all in their power to save the Soviet government from collapse. They will probably see what Allied statesmen so far have refused to see, that Bolshevism is very largely a matter of circumstances and that the Soviet government may survive in name and form without retaining very much revolutionary Bolshevism. If Russia's unprecedented patience and powers of endurance hold out long enough, German capital, products and industrial experts will find their way into Russia and the basis will be laid for a firm political and economic alliance between Russia and Germany. The enormous resources of Russia and Germany will be pooled and Poland, without doubt, will become commercially and socially homogeneous with her two powerful neighbors, with whom her nationals are accustomed and bound by circumstances to deal. Parenthetically it should be added that Poland's membership in the League of Nations can be useful and effective only if its policy and action conform in large measure to the natural economic and political aspirations of the people whose affairs it attempts to control.

It is not necessary nor perhaps profitable to dwell upon the probable consequences of an alliance between Germany and Russia. It is enough that such an alliance will be hostile to the Associated governments, with a hostility based upon the suffering and resentment of the people themselves and will constitute a tremendous obstacle to a harmonious world order if not a serious menace to future peace.

Since the Associated Powers cannot, by starvation nor such force as can be commanded for the purpose, remodel the internal organization of Russia to accord with their conceptions of democracy, and since attempts in this direction appear to be destined to produce terrible suffering and loss of life in Russia, to spread Bolshevism in all parts of the world and to weld two powerful nations into a firm alliance hostile to the Allies, it would seem to be clearly and pressingly urgent that the Associated Powers reconsider their Russian policy and try to devise at once measures which will surely prevent this many-sided catastrophe.

Recent reports indicate that Bolshevist Russia has reached a new stage in its political and economic development. The Bolshevist leaders, it appears, are learning by experience the limitations of their theories and abilities and are turning to the highly trained and professional class of the country for assistance. This class, heretofore suspect and hostile, is responding to the call, partly through genuine patriotism and sympathy for the suffering Russian people, and partly through loss of hope that any of the organized anti-Bolshevik movements will succeed in doing more than prolong civil war and desperate conditions. Absorbing this class into their regime, the regime itself will take on a new character, not unlike that of the social order which we may be destined to see in all of western Europe. The precise extent to which each nation is to adjust itself to the working-class protest is a problem for that nation, but it seems to be agreed by thoughtful men, whatever their personal wishes may be, that all of western Europe is bound to see a very great increase in the political power of labor and a very great extension of democratic principles in the conduct of industry. This development will mean that western Europe is to approach from one direction what Bolshevist Russia is to approach from the other, and the result will be substantial homogeneity and understanding between the east and the west.

The same reports state that the Bolshevist leaders are in desperate need of capital and are appealing to the Associated governments to remove the blockade in order that their nationals may come in and obtain valuable concessions for their capital. These two needs—brains and capital—have been plainly recognized by the Soviet leaders and it should be evident to shrewd men that this means a vital departure in principle and practice for Soviet Russia. They should see that Bolshevism is showing signs of curing itself and they should have sufficient faith in the good sense of the Russian people to act on the belief that through the Soviets or otherwise, Bolshevism as it has so far manifested

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itself, will cease to dominate Russia. The Russian people will inevitably learn by experience the dependence of a sound social order on the highly trained professional class. If the Bolshevists fail to learn this they will without doubt fail to retain the support of the people and will pass from power.

The new development in Russia creates for the Associated governments the duty and the opportunity of winning the official friendship of Soviet Russia and of making a start towards winning the forgiveness of the Russian people for the suffering and sorrow inflicted upon them by the blockade.

A better order of things in Russia can only result from the restoration of trade and the acquisition by Russia of transportation facilities and other industrial products essential to her economic life. Plans for feeding these things in gradually, concurrently with the advance of Allied and anti-Bolshevik military forces have failed utterly. The acceptance of Dr. Nansen's proposal can have no practical results under present conditions. The Associated governments have reached a point in the Russian policy where they must undoubtedly follow a new and definite policy.

This policy should take substantially the following form: an identic note should be sent to all of the de facto governments of Russia and published in the press, stating that in view of the conclusion of peace between the Associated governments and Germany, and in view of the increasingly distressing economic conditions of Russia, the Associated governments have reached the conclusion that all military operations in Russia should cease and that all restrictions on trade between Russia and other countries should be removed; that the Associated governments recognize the desirability of Russia's continuing as a single nation having territorial boundaries coextensive with those of the Imperial Russian government prior to the Revolution (except as modified by the recognition of Finland and perhaps one or two other countries as independent states), and that in view of this fact they take the liberty of proposing to all of the de facto governments now established in Russia that they also suspend all military operations and join in convoking a general assembly representing the entire population of Russia, the members of this assembly to be chosen by secret ballot and under fair methods of election, this assembly when so elected to succeed the several de facto governments as the sovereign government of all of Russia. The Associated governments should offer their services and should suggest that neutral governments be asked to contribute their services to assist the several de facto governments in holding the election in a manner calculated to render it fair and final.

The Associated governments should go further. They should offer to extend aid, financial and otherwise, to a government of Russia established in the manner indicated. It might be feasible to pursue this policy under the principle of the League of Nations, pending its organization. It is believed that if President Wilson would undertake these overtures they would meet with such favor among the Russian people, that none of the governments would dare decline the offer made.

If the proposal is not accepted the Associated governments should, for the reasons which have been given, lift the blockade and withdraw all forces from Russia, leaving the settlement of Russian conditions to the Russian people and the influences growing out of the resumption of trade with the rest of the world.

SHELTON HALE.

John L. Sullivan, The Strong Boy of Boston

(Dedicated to Louis Untermeyer and Robert Frost)

When I was nine years old, in 1889
I sent my love a lacy Valentine.
Suffering boys were dressed like Fauntleroys,
While Judge and Puck in giant humor vied,
The Gibson girl came shining like a bride
To spoil the cult of Tennyson's Elaine.
Louise May Alcott was my gentle guide . . .
Then . . .
I heard a battle trumpet sound.
Nigh New Orleans
Upon an emerald plain
John L. Sullivan
The strong boy
of Boston
Fought seventy-five red rounds with Jake Kilrain.

In simple sheltered 1889
Nick Carter I would piously deride.
Over the Elsie Books I moped and sighed.
St. Nicholas Magazine was all my pride,
While coarser boys on cellar doors would slide.
The grown-ups bought refinement by the pound.
Rogers groups had not been told to hide—
E. P. Roe had just begun to wane.
Howells was rising, surely to attain.
The nation for a jamboree was gowned:—
Her hundredth year of roaring freedom crowned.
The British Lion ran and hid from Blaine
The razzle-dazzle hip-hurrah from Maine.
The mocking bird was singing in the lane . . .
Yet . . .
"East side, west side, all around the town
The tots sang: 'ring-a-rosie'
'London Bridge is falling down.'"
And . . .
John L. Sullivan
The strong boy
Of Boston
Broke every single rib of Jake Kilrain.

In dear provincial 1889,
Barnum's bears and tigers could astound.
Ingersoll was named along with Cain
Voltaire, Appolyon, and Thomas Paine.
Robert Elsmore riled the pious brain.
Phillips Brooks for heresy was tried.
Boston Brahmins patronized Mark Twain.
The base-ball rules were changed. That was a gain.
Pop Anson was our darling and our pride.
Native sons in Irish votes were drowned.
Tammany once more escaped its chain.
Once more each crimson dive was raising Cain.
The mocking bird was singing in the lane . . .
Yet . . .
"East side, west side, all around the town
The tots sang: 'ring-a-rosie'
'London Bridge is falling down.'"
And . . .
John L. Sullivan
The strong boy
Of Boston
Finished the ring career of Jake Kilrain.

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In mystic, ancient 1889,
Wilson with pure learning was allied,
Roosevelt gave forth a chirping sound.
Stanley found old Emin and his train.
Stout explorers sought the pole in vain.
To dream of flying proved a man insane.
The newly rich were bathing in Champagne.
Van Bibber Davis, at a single bound
Displayed himself, and simpering glory found.
John J. Ingalls, like a lonely crane
Swore and swore, and stalked the Kansas plain.
The Cronin murder was the ages' stain.
Johnstown was flooded, and the whole world cried.
We heard not of Louvain nor of Lorraine,
Or a million heroes for their freedom slain.
Of Armageddon and the world's birth—pain—
The mocking bird was singing in the lane . . .
Yet . . .
" East side, west side, all around the town
The tots sang: ' ring-a-rosie '
'London Bridge is falling down.' "
And . . .
John L. Sullivan knocked out Jake Kilrain.

VACHEL LINDSAY.

CORRESPONDENCE

Church League for Social and Industrial Democracy

SIR: As Acting Executive Secretary of a newly formed organization within the Episcopal Church I am sending you a copy of the Statement of Principles. The officers selected to act until our meeting in Detroit at the time of the General Convention of the Episcopal Church are the following: Rt. Rev. Charles D. Williams, Bishop of Michigan, Acting President; Miss Vida D. Scudder, Wellesley College, Chairman Executive Committee pro tem; Rev. Richard W. Hogue, D.D., Temporary Executive Secretary. Among the members of our Executive Committee are: Rev. J. Howard Melish, D.D., Holy Trinity, Brooklyn; Dean Bernard Iddings Bell of the Episcopal War Commission, New York; Dean Charles N. Lathrop, Milwaukee, Wis.; Mrs. Mary Simkovitch, Greenwich House, New York; Dean W. P. Ladd, Berkeley Divinity School, Conn.

Preamble:

We face a world in revolution. Some regret the fact; some thank God for it. Regret and gratitude are in a sense equally irrelevant; the Church is called to act, and the contemporary situation furnishes her with a challenge and an opportunity unsurpassed since Pentecost.

Her right course, in the opinion of the Church League for Social and Industrial Democracy, is thus indicated.

Purpose:

The purpose of this organization is to unite, for intercession and labor those within the Episcopal Church who believe that it is an essential part of the Church's function to make justice and love the controlling motives in all social change, and who wish, as Christians, to promote all sound movements looking toward the democratization of industry and the socialization of life.

Membership:

Any member of the Episcopal Church who signs the Statement of Principles which forms section two of this Article of the Constitution shall be considered a member.

Statement of Principles:

We, the undersigned, members of our Lord Jesus Christ, recognizing that our discipleship pledges us to become like Him in sacrificial love and conscious of our power through Him to further the speedy coming of His Kingdom on earth, do give our assent to the following principles:

I. We affirm our belief that only that social order can properly be called Christian which substitutes fraternal cooperation for mastership, in industry and life.

II. We assent to the following declaration, officially promulgated by the General Convention of the Church, and promise earnestly to assist the Church in putting into actual practice the principles therein laid down, viz.

Whereas, The moral and spiritual welfare of the people demands that the highest possible standard of living should everywhere be maintained, and that all conduct of industry should emphasize the search for such higher and more human forms and organization as will generally elicit the personal initiative and self-respect of the workman, and give him a definite personal stake in the system of production:

Whereas, Injustice and disproportionate inequality as well as misunderstanding, prejudice and mutual distrust as between employer and employee are widespread in our social and industrial life today:

Therefore, Be it resolved, the House of Bishops concurring:

That we, The members of the General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church, do hereby affirm that the Church stands for the ideal of social justice and that it demands the achievement of a social order in which the social cause of poverty and the gross human waste of the present order shall be eliminated; and in which every worker shall have a just return for that which he produces, a free opportunity for self-development and a fair share in all the gains of progress. And since such a social order can only be achieved progressively by the effort of men and women who in the spirit of Christ put the common welfare above private gain the Church calls upon every communicant, Clerical and Lay, seriously to take part in the study of the complex conditions under which we are called upon to live, and so to act that the present prejudice and injustice may be supplanted by mutual understanding, sympathy and just dealings, and the ideal of thoroughgoing democracy may be finally realized in our land.

III. We believe that, far from the Church being in tendency and membership reactionary and unawakened, it is, as a matter of fact, ready and anxious, to a degree unsuspected by the world, to discover the way in which it can best be useful in forwarding the new order; and we, therefore, pledge ourselves to help the great mass of Church people who are as yet uncertain how they can function.

IV. We believe that for us as Christians the proper procedure is not to formulate a social policy and then seek to justify it from our religion, but rather to start with our Lord's revealed will and to deduce from it our social programme; with no equivocation or evasion.

V. In case of persons in our own communion whose positions are endangered by reason of their social radicalism we promise to make investigation and if necessary to publish the facts; and to the limit of our ability we intend to give moral and practical support to religious teachers and preachers, who shall clearly be seen to have incurred persecution through advocacy of social change.

VI. We believe that the Church of Jesus Christ has a distinctive contribution to make and responsibility to fulfil which do not characterize secular organizations. We recognize the supreme need of the world for that Power by which men and women of faith shall gain the strength and wisdom requisite for the surrenders and readjustments

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of democratic living. We, therefore, pledge ourselves to encourage the use of prayer and sacraments, that through them people may be released from selfish inhibitions and inspired to work with God for humanity.

VII. We are keenly conscious of the urgent need that the Church preach the Power and Will of Jesus Christ, not only to the passing era of selfish competition and industrial mastership, but also to the emerging democratic order. We recognize that the mere transfer of social control from a self-seeking few to a self-seeking many would in itself be of no benefit to the world and of no honor to God, and we therefore are convinced that in terms of the new day of industrial democracy the Gospel of Salvation by sacrifice, service, and fraternity must be preached with no uncertain voice.

VIII. Recognizing the earnest endeavor under difficulties of those working within our theological seminaries to train our coming clergy for useful labors in the new age, we intend to work for such changes in management and curriculum as shall enable theological students to know, preach, and practice the social Gospel. We further intend to assist in recruiting such candidates for the ministry as shall enter it with desire for socialized leadership.

IX. We pledge ourselves to investigate social and industrial programmes as they may arise, to make contact with their leaders and authors and to spread accurate knowledge of them among our Church people.

X. We deplore the contemporary suppression of freedom in America and shall work for the immediate restoration of those bulwarks of democracy, the rights of free assembly, free discussion, a free press and a free pulpit. Without these any minority seeking to express itself is encouraged to the use of force.

XI. In making this Statement we are convinced that we endorse no things irrelevant to the Church's abiding mission, but that we reaffirm the convictions of the great company of the prophets, saints and martyrs of days past, and of the Lord of the Kingdom, Our Saviour and Redeemer, Jesus Christ, to the fulfilment of whose Holy Will we hereby dedicate ourselves anew.

Baltimore, Maryland. R. W. HAGUE.

Communism

SIR: Your editorial on Our Case Against the Soviet Republic is extremely illuminating, since it presents the existing order in a light in which very few of the modern revolutionists take the trouble to study it. With their attention focussed on the glaring abuses of the old economic order, the prophets of change indeed are prone to forget its chief virtue—that it works. The system of private property has indeed made civilization possible—art, science, literature—and one should be made to show just cause before he is allowed to substitute a risky and untried social experiment.

You have rendered a service by emphasizing these facts, for all intelligent radicals should be cognizant of them before embarking upon new adventures. But aren't you over-estimating the success of the capitalistic system and under-estimating the efficiency of communism?

In citing the spur of economic reward as one of the reasons for the success of capitalism, you are committing yourself to a theory that has long been discredited by intelligent thinkers. Despite the emphasis upon monetary values, which is one of the oppressive features of the capitalistic machine, tending to make everybody think *sub specie auri,* so to speak, the greatest advances in science and in industry are made with no thought of pecuniary reward. Chemists, or engineers who work patiently in their laboratories, and come upon new discoveries, usually receive no rewards except honor and the inner personal satisfaction of accomplishment. These men work efficiently, because they have a good living assured to them, and can view their work as an avocation instead of routine drudgery.

It is true that in the ordinary field of production, the economic spur is the greatest factor tending toward efficient production. But that is because the economic needs of both the workers and the directing class have never been fully assured. Every one, be he the lowest paid worker or a millionaire capitalist, fears subconsciously that he may lose his source of income, and hence resorts to money as the only insurance against dire contingency.

Change the conditions of livelihood or the social environment, and see what a difference is made in the question of money. Many of us have recently had the experience of being in the army or navy, where the conditions of life are radically different from those that obtain in ordinary business. With all physical needs taken care of by the government, money soon ceases to have much importance to the average soldier. And if the army were hermetically sealed from civil contact, it would have no importance in the life of a soldier. As it is, one has only to think of the way in which the soldier gambles away his pay the very night that he receives it, to realize the fall in value of money.

At this point you may say, that the disappearance of the economic factor necessitates the introduction of physical compulsion in the army in order to insure efficient work. This element is by no means essential to the efficient operation of the military machine, and there is little doubt in many minds that it might work better without it.

Turn to the colleges, and you will observe students spending hours upon hours of intellectual drudgery, without the thought of material reward, merely for the joy of accomplishment and the incentive of honor.

It was H. G. Wells who first illustrated the truth that in the kingdom of the blind, one must bow to the common failing and suppress his sight. The greatest vice of capitalism is the abnormal pressure it puts upon honorable men to abandon their honor and lust after money. Destroy the capitalistic environment and you will liberate millions of men and women, set them free to realize the higher aspirations of their being.

Throughout the course of your argument runs the idea that "human nature" is static. Modern science shows that to be absolutely fallacious. What passes under the term human nature, is nothing more than the product of artificial environment. Change environment, and you will change "human nurture," to use the more accurate term of Professor Robinson.

The really fundamental problems of human nature are the things to be grappled with after the preliminary revolution is accomplished. Under the present system all the energy of the reformers is spent in tinkering with the machinery of production, slowly adjusting the hours of labor, the proportion of distribution, etc. The aim of communism is to concentrate this reform into one big revolution. Then when that is done, make room for the still greater problems that remain to be solved.

Communism does not aspire to bring in the millennium, but it is a serious attempt to solve systematically the world's great problems—beginning bottommost with the economic.

New York City. ROBERT LIVINGSTON.

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Books and Things

MR. HEARST is not without a sort of courage, Lord Northcliffe has courage of several sorts, but imagine the indignant panic of either if you could force him to choose between having his newspapers suppressed and running them in conformity with the code which dictated his private life to a gentleman! They would no doubt agree, once you had worked the preliminary miracle of making them realize what kind of animal a gentleman is, that he could not run a daily paper—not so as to please himself—without running it into the ground. Even when they agree, Lord Northcliffe and Mr. Hearst are not invariably wrong, but in this case they would be. Mr. C. P. Scott exists to prove them wrong. Ever since he took command of the Manchester Guardian it has gone in for "equities, decencies, uncompelled fairnesses." Mr. Scott has made "a fad of a novel—or is it antiquated?—patriotism, remote from the current modes of that virtue. For scarcely any spite goes to the making of it, and no fear at all; it has not been come at by trains of reasoning, nor taken out of a book, nor is it a hot sense of having the title-deeds to a fat estate, nor a caterer's impulse to meet any demand his customers may make for special emotions. It is mere, sheer affection." Mr. Scott doesn't believe "that lust is not lust if one's own nation feels it, nor theft if there be no jail in which it could cause her hair to be cut." What misleads him into these heresies is most of all the way he knows "England, every look of her face and the shape of her bones. English downs with dawn breaking over them" seem to him "to put up a troubling petition that they may not be befouled."

These quoted passages, in which I have changed a few tenses, were not written avowedly about Mr. Scott. They are from Mr. C. E. Montague's novel, The Morning's War (Henry Holt, 1913), and they occur in a description of Mullivant and Bruntwood, editor and business manager of a daily published in Brabburn, which I take to be more Manchester than anything else, just as I take Mullivant's and Bruntwood's aims and methods to be Mr. Scott's own. No one knows Mr. Scott better than Mr. Montague, who was the Guardian's chief leader writer for many years. He resigned in 1914, being past military age, in order to do war work as near the front as he could get. All the Brabburn part of the Morning's War is in praise of one kind of journalism, and Mr. Montague's earlier novel, A Hind Let Loose (London, Methuen, 1910), is an attack upon two other kinds. Mr. Roads, one kind of newspaper owner and editor whom Mr. Montague dislikes, commenced journalism by starting the Weekly Eye-Opener, which died when parliament tightened the law against gambling. Not, however, before Roads had put by a tidy sum of money. "Going on, with £150,000 in pocket, from strength to strength, he founded a daily paper, not for talented people and sportsmen only, but for everybody. Soon he had two—one in a Scotch city, one in an English; each, when opened, undoubtedly gave you a more poignant first sense of the appalling or intoxicating character of yesterday than any of the older journals offered for double the money. You might often think, from the way those niggards fubbed off their customers, that nothing seismic or cataclysmic at all had happened for twenty-four hours. Roads resented this slander on the richness, the diversity of life; no day but, as his paper showed, England was slapped in the face by somebody, somewhere; no day but he rolled up Britannia's sleeve and said, 'Feel that biceps!' It kept your blood nicely on the boil. New worlds, too, came in to cover the bald places of the old; and our mother England's broken and precarious flow of murders and connubial convulsions worth reporting was replenished from a score of tributary rills in Paris, Brussels, Vienna and Melbourne; the lusts of New York and the homicides of California enriched for the first time the sacred home life of English families at their next morning's breakfast."

Both A Hind Let Loose and The Morning's War are better books to reread than to read a first time, when each raises hopes it doesn't satisfy. A Hind Let Loose is a farce, which should have been no longer than an anecdote, and which is told and commented upon and slowed up through three hundred pages by an able, first-hand critic of life. The characters are all-of-a-piece and unsurprising. They never surprise Mr. Montague, whose penetrating and brilliant observation seems too good to be wasted on such obsequious tools of his farcical purposes. In The Morning's War the characters are much more lifelike. The heroine's father, Mr. Hathersage, is one of the best contemporary portraits I've seen of a certain kind of patrician, the cultivated, worldly, faint, disillusioned kind. His daughter remembers their journey in Italy: "And, all the way south from Lugano, churches, galleries; galleries, churches, and always—she hated herself for remembering—the voice of her father, seemlily modulous, weaving its webs of picked, relevant comment between her and so many things which—she dimly suspected—had little to do with the world he walked in, a world of culture fallen rather a-weary, half-understanding everything, placing everything, summoning up at the instance of every new thing, or thing newly seen, its appropriate mood of semi-emotion, as settled by balance of expert authority. Webs of blown rain between her and the St. Gotthard snows; webs of pertinent, passionless words between her and Bellini's tranced sense of the wonder of Motherhood; curtains of ordered, raptureless reverence hung between her and that 'Crucifixion' at Rome. . . ."

In The Morning's War, which is a romance, it's odd and upsetting to follow the way by which Mr. Montague, a writer so fresh and original, who can "make a noise of his own" with ideas as well as with words, has gone elaborately wrong with his plot. His problem was the usual one, how to devise an obstacle that would separate two lovers, and for this obstacle's sake he goes back nearly three hundred years in his prologue, to the early seventeenth century, where he plants causes which result in his lovers turning out to be cousins without knowing it, she being a good Catholic, he the son of an unfrocked priest. This far-sought obstacle, aided by the hero's convenient and improbable and fatuous scruples, does separate the lovers, and does keep them apart for a few pages, at the end of which one of the most opportune poisoned arrows in fiction restores them each to the other's arms. What does all this matter? It matters terribly at a first reading, when one keeps repeating with bitterness that Mr. Montague is several hundred times too good a man to deal in such shop-worn wares. It matters ever so much less when you reread The Morning's War, as I often do, for its observation, its mind, its pictures and episodes, its beauty of spirit and words. We are all sick and tired of the epithet "distinguished," so abused and rubbed, but no other presents itself oftener while we read Mr. Montague.

Except by reading him it is impossible to acquaint oneself with the range of his observation. Public school educa-

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tion is to him, among other things, "the long frost in which we bind, with so much care, the wits of the picked youth of Britain." And it has its reward. Listening to the talk of one of its finished products, in his middle age, "you lived back and forward, back to the blithe days at school when they first taught you never to think your own thoughts or take what came in a way of your own, but to pool your brains with the rest and 'throw yourself into the life of the school,' and on to your early manhood's deeper training in resemblance to others, and so to the good day, always coming and always here, always to be had by him who wills it with his might, when the imitative shall inherit the earth." Every few pages the ironic and lonely-minded writer of this passage turns his attention to a new subject, for his own pleasure and ours. His touch revives tired figures of speech: "A drowning man would grab at a scythe, to be saved; give him a barbed wire life-line, he'll tie it on, naked. Pinn flung himself on to Fay's words of indulgent contempt; he twisted them into the longed-for assent." Here is the Irish sea, from the deck of a boat: "The night was beautiful with stars, and the sea only moved as the flesh does in sleep, with the lovely heave of the measure of life." Here is a bit of Ireland: "Cusheen is not made of earth, like other places that people live in. It's stone—one rumpled sheet of it; some drift dirt in the wrinkles, of course, but the rest just naked; it streamed and shone with rain, like wet slates in moonlight."

In no other novel I know is there a mountain climb comparable to the ascent of the Dent Rouge in The Morning's War. It ranks with the most thrilling chapters in Mummery or Signor Guido Rey. And how Mr. Montague can see that arête! "Overhead the ridge was a file of shattered towers: it mounted wavering; now four or five of these towers, one after another, would shoot straight up at the sky; then some blast from the south would seem to have caught a whole troop of them—all their tips swayed to the north; like a row of blown flames they bent out over space; and then the blown look would pass and a fifty-foot splinter of straight stone would shoot up again." Or listen to him when he is standing on a bridge in Manchester, looking down: "Below, on the torpid stream, refuse oils draw sheeny curvilinear grainings, parodies of a rainbow's palette, on a chocolate ground; late at night the quiet lifts into relief the still, small plop of bubbles rising and breaking, a million infinitesimal belches."

What most exhilarates one in Mr. Montague's books is the joy he openly takes in observing and in exactly recording. It excites him—to satire now, now to a sharp beauty of metaphor, to a dactylic or anapaestic rhythm which makes us hear a voice in his prose with our bodily ears. His hatreds, too, excite him to the same things, hatred of sloppy English and sloppy thinking, of running with the herd, of eagerness to believe evil of your enemies, of readiness to forgive in yourself what you condemn in all others. Among his loves, which equally excite him, are first-handedness, the weaker side, the lost cause still to be fought for and made, past hope, to prevail; danger on ice-slopes and in newspaper offices, adverse currents and keen airs. Such a temper has its excesses—in Mr. Montague's case one guesses at an excessive dread of praise and of self-pity—"self-pity, the sneak, came whining round him"—as if each, taken in moderation, had not its uses. One's most general impression is that Mr. Montague finds a hardy and arduous life one of the most amusing of all forms of sport, and that he wouldn't thank you for saying so. P. L.

Industrial Democracy?

Man to Man, by John Leitch. New York: B. C. Forbes Co.

MAN TO MAN is probably the most widely read business book of recent years. Nevertheless it should be reviewed less as a book than as a plan for shop organization. For its literary character is a matter of less interest than the validity of its suggestions, although Mr. Leitch deserves credit for having put his material into good, ordinary American lingo of the sort which has carried the circulation of certain weeklies over the two million mark.

Mr. Leitch believes in people—whether or not they wear over-alls; and out of this belief grows his faith in his plan for representative government in factories. This "government" aims to be analogous in structure to our Federal political organization. The workers choose from among their number a "House of Representatives"; the foremen constitute a "Senate"; the executives are the "Cabinet." These bodies meet on company time to discuss any and all matters relevant to the smooth working of the plant; decisions are carried up to the cabinet, and there final action and power of veto resides. In order to stimulate action which shall be constructive, the plan further provides that one half of the value of all increases in efficiency which result in lowered costs shall be divided among the workers of the improved department. By this efficiency bonus, Mr. Leitch believes a considerable spur to individual interest and initiative can be applied.

This, stated very summarily, is the scheme of shop organization which Mr. Leitch has introduced in over a dozen plants in the last few years. That it meets what business executives usually consider the acid test, is evidenced by the fact that it is the rare exception for any plant where Mr. Leitch has worked to have a strike after his arrival; and in some cases where the rest of the local industry became involved in a tie-up, the "federally-governed" plant "has staid by the management" and refused to go out.

Mr. Leitch's success, judged from the point of view of the employers' response, appears to be phenomenal, and no one will begrudge him the popularity which the more permanently sound aspects of his plan earn for him. But it is success of a sort to raise questions; it has come suddenly, easily and abundantly, and it has come largely in the world of employers. The simple and unadorned thesis that managers must today deal with their employees by some group method and must formally organize representative channels of communication between workers and executives, is sound. If Mr. Leitch can popularize this truth of the validity of shop organization he will perform a real service. And, from the employer's point of view, he performs in even more valuable service in offering a *concrete* plan. It sometimes seems as if the employer—especially when he is somewhat panic-stricken—cares less about the nature of the proposal which is sold to him than for the conviction which the man carries who is "selling" him. The modern advertiser knows that the salesman is effective for his much speaking; and let him tell the employer often enough that strikes can be avoided by certain methods of organization and those methods will be tried. The "federal plan" is concrete; it is psychologically attractive. Even the plain man's mind is naturally prompted to the syllogism: our Federal government is a democratic form of government; we adapt this form to the organization of a factory; we have "industrial democracy." It is very easy and very plausible.

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The plan has moreover, the merit of restoring in the management an attitude of concern for workers as people. To be sure Mr. Leitch himself appears to occupy a considerable place as interlocutor and one gets the feeling that it is his personality and attitude which may be the chief factor in determining success or failure. Nevertheless, executives do have to get a closer understanding of their men if the federal organization is to function well, and the result has unqualifiedly sound values.

The stimulus to efficiency covered by the "collective economy dividend" is naturally looked upon by employers as a boon. By this arrangement the employees of a department divide equally with the management the amount of the savings effected in the production of that department in a given period. Testimony seems to show that remarkable increases in output result, and that workers are stirred to a genuine interest in technical improvement. It is less clear, however, that the incentive which is really operative is the immediately obvious financial one. What seems really to animate the workers to constructive interest and workmanly pride, as shown by the minutes of their meetings which Mr. Leitch gives, is the chance they have to meet together, to have access to production and cost records, to call in the foremen of departments, to see the factory as a whole, as a production unit—in short, to satisfy their creative impulses.

Mr. Robert B. Wolf has called this the "non-financial incentive," and while Mr. Leitch probably recognizes its presence, he does not stress psychological values specifically but prefers to put the appeal in wholly money terms. And he makes use of a plausible method of division in going "fifty-fifty" on the economy dividend. It would be interesting to know how he would justify this division if the workers claimed the entire dividend. It is, in short, a regrettable omission that Mr. Leitch does not specifically emphasize the value of his (or any other) plan of shop organization as the indispensable condition of fostering workmanship. Since he is pressing political analogies into use, he should have said flatly that productivity is based upon the willing consent of the producers.

Mr. Leitch's attitude toward trade unions, in so far as this book reveals it, must be characterized as evasive. The sentences with which he dismisses the subject are indeed the most egregious ones in the book. "But what of the union trouble," he says in discussing a plant where he has worked, "what of the closed shop? What happened to the original grievances? They got lost in the shuffle. There are no differences between the men and the company. The men have made their own wages higher than they could possibly ask through the union; they do not need outside rules because they make their own rules. The men and the company being one, no room has yet been found for an outsider to wedge into."

Unfortunately for Mr. Leitch it is around the questions involved in the recognition of unions that the issue of shop good-will more and more centers. The presence of the unions in the factory defines sharply the problem of control. The "federal plan" also defines it, but in a quite opposite way. As one critic has pointed out, the workers' body, the House of Representatives, is under this plan really outvoted two to one by the other chambers. The final appeal is to the cabinet. The workers have no expert spokesman from outside—while the company has Mr. Leitch. There are no joint sessions—it is simply a hierarchy of committees in which the manual workers are given a sense that they are deciding something, whereas the real power resides in the management. And whether the ultimate power is in local hands or in the hands of investment bankers in a distant metropolis is, of course, a question quite beyond the purview of the workers' organization.

The federal structure presupposes, in other words, a perfectly static relationship between workers and managers, a vague harmony of interests between them and a ready acquiescence on the part of the workers in the whole machinery of competitive capitalist business.

Joint relations with organized labor through collective bargains put a quite different complexion on the question of control. The management meets with delegated workers, acting as representatives of its own men and those in the industry as a whole. These delegates have the advice and assistance of trade union leaders who are in a position to know the condition of the industry as a whole, and in a position to plead a case effectively and without fear of subsequent prejudice to their jobs. Definition is thus made jointly on a basis of more nearly equal bargaining power regarding wage rates, hours, the right of discharge and other vital issues. Responsibility for directing production remains where it has to remain under present conditions—with the management; but beyond that the control is no longer absolutely in the manager's hands. Employers will say that confusion results when control is not centralized; that it is a merit of the Leitch proposal that it leaves control just where it now is. But this objection to dealings with the unions ignores two facts: first, that divided control on matters like terms of employment does not mean confusion if there has been clear delegation of authority and definition of responsibility; and second, that the day is past when "industrial democracy" can be associated with procedure which still leaves final control on all matters with the head executives.

The workers' demand for collective bargaining with the unions undoubtedly raises questions which the "federal plan" does not answer. And if we consider the problem of control still further, we find other questions ignored by it. Of these the most fundamental is the problem of factory autonomy. To what extent is it true today that the policy of self-determination and splendid isolation applies to individual factories? Are we not face to face with the old states' rights problem in an industrial setting? Can each factory go its own way without relation to the practices of other plants in the same industry? The answer seems to be, both from political and industrial experience, that the factory is in reality in a more or less close relationship to its competitors in the same industry. The tendency is all in the direction of recognizing the common interests which competing firms have. Increasing uniformity in labor standards by industries and joint determination of those standards on a national scale is the meaning of the whole national industrial council movement which even now is spreading from England to our shores. Unquestionably there are vital matters which concern the individual shop alone—but that is not what Mr. Leitch is saying. For him democracy in industry means what "self-determination" seems to mean in central and eastern Europe: the raising up of numerous independent and autonomous administrative units, in this case related together, if at all, only on the side of the employer.

Two further limitations upon the effectiveness of the Leitch idea deserve mention. As a practical matter it is uneconomical of time, good-will and educational advantage, to make no provision for joint sessions. Under the federal plan each problem is discussed by three separate bodies and none of the three has the advantage of being present at the discussions of the other two. This is a wasteful and un-

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businesslike method. But a more serious objection must be urged.

This method is fundamentally a denial of the necessary conditions of any real industrial democracy, namely, that all the different parties at interest in the carrying on of a function should be present in the deliberative body which determines how that function is to be performed. If it means anything, industrial democracy means the organization of the industrial life of a nation, first for the avowed purpose of public service and second on a basis of the control of each industry by those in that industry. To speak of industrial democracy in any less penetrating sense is confusing and misleading.

Finally, the federal plan appears to ignore the importance of the management's taking its own job seriously. This may seem a surprising statement; but it should be realized that the managerial function of correlating the selling and producing departments, of wise buying of material and equipment, of competent control of the flow of work through the plant, is one that must be intelligently handled if the plant is to be truly efficient. Any step which attempts to get the workers involved in doing their part in the securing of low costs but omits to involve the management in doing its part, is one-sided and in danger of defeating its own ends unless reciprocity can be at once secured. Nothing could be more hazardous or more unfair than to ask the workers to assume a share of responsibility for those matters which under any rational functionalization are management duties. What can a shop committee accomplish in improving quality if the purchasing agent buys inferior material? How can workers get quantity production if one department is the "neck of the bottle"—has too little equipment to allow the normal volume of work from preceding departments to flow through it without congestion? How can there be competent administration of working conditions and employment methods if there exists no single department to specialize on these matters?

It may not be fair to say that Mr. Leitch's book ignores these considerations, but he certainly fails to point out that competent management is an indispensable corollary of successful shop organization. In the absence of this competent workers may be asked to make up by their organized efforts for deficiencies which are in no sense theirs. There is real danger that plants which are casting about for quick returns on an old investment may essay shop committees when they need in the first instance to scrap old machinery and adopt modern methods of routing and scheduling production.

It is easy to account, therefore, for the sudden enthusiasm for this brand of "industrial democracy." It is democracy in name only. It stabilizes and improves the operation of the factory under its present ownership and control. It tries to shift to the workers responsibility for results while authority still remains with the management. It builds up a plausible company loyalty. It assumes that the wage earner has no interests which diverge from those of his employer. Yet despite these grave shortcomings in principle and method, one would advise employers and executives to read the book. It has real value for those who are still acting on "old school" ideas. It personalizes the work of the manager. "Manufacturing consists primarily in making men—they will attend to the product." It shows the value of organization among employees. It reveals the instinctive springs of workmanship. But after reading the volume the ardent and anxious employer should listen to these words from a recently published interview with the owner of a plant where Mr. Lietch's scheme has been installed: "We have discovered," he says, "that it is a slow process of education for both sides. Tact, diplomacy, ingenuity and a desire to see absolute justice done are requisites for success."

The extent of the popularity of Mr. Leitch's book is the truest possible measure of the profound bewilderment characteristic of managerial thinking today. It is therefore doubly regrettable that his attitude toward unionism is so unsympathetic and his conception of industrial democracy so parochial. Perhaps if his thinking on these points had been more fundamental he would never have written this interesting volume. ORDWAY TEAD.

Rousseau

Rousseau's Social Contract, edited by C. E. Vaughan. New York: Longmans Green & Co.

IF this is not the ideal edition of Rousseau's book it is something very like it. Less monumental than the magnificent work of Dreyfus-Brissac, less highly compressed than the brilliant analysis of Beaulavon, it yet gives the student of the Social Contract practically all the necessary materials for a full understanding of what Rousseau taught. An excellent introduction analyzes the actual teaching of the book. Brief but equally excellent notes trace the historic relation of certain fundamental dicta to the rest of Rousseau's writings. A short but suggestive appendix gives a good outline of the Social Contract theory. The edition is, in fact, exactly what an edition of a classical work ought to be and generally is not. The text is Rousseau's and not Professor Vaughan's; the editor has wisely avoided the subtle temptation to substitute his own thoughts for those apparently the author's. The apparatus criticus is enough to make the reader understand that the comprehension of Rousseau's work is dependent upon something more than a cursory reading of the actual text. And every student who reads those admirable volumes of the lamented Paul Masson, which Professor Vaughan so rightly commends, will understand why that something more than a cursory reading, may very well become the eager effort of a lifetime.

Professor Vaughan's volume has another value upon which emphasis should be laid. It represents something very near the crest of the reaction against the consistent depreciation of Rousseau which finds its ablest expression in Lord Morley's book. The causes of that reaction are, of course, many and far-reaching. Rousseau was especially identified with the French Revolution and it is evident, after more than a century, how large a part of its work has suffered frustration. Rousseau's own life, moreover, was not of the kind which gives a confidence in the careful analysis which in fact lies at the bottom of his teaching. He embraced doctrines that have long been exploded; and this enabled his critics to urge that since large parts of his structure are palpably false, therefore the whole must be untrue. He is so aware of the difficulties of his problem that large parts of what he wrote read either as brilliant paradoxes or as inconsistent sciolism. He had little or no historical background. He was ignorant of law, ignorant of administration, very largely ignorant of history. Nothing, as a consequence has been easier than to represent him as merely a brilliant but wayward child of nature led astray by a sense of oppression due mostly to the native melancholy

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of his temperament. It is only in the last forty years that the vast importance of his work has been truly seen. He was the spiritual father of conservatism in Hegel, and, through him, of Green and Bosanquet with the specialized liberalism to which they gave birth. He represents a revival, at bottom Platonic, of the cause of society as a whole against the claims of the individual. He is, in fact, the first direct opponent of the excesses of political individualism we owe to the Protestant Reformation. That is why, as Professor Vaughan says, his book marks a turning point in the history of Europe.

No one can understand Rousseau who does not realize that his book has a sub-title and that the sub-title is the real pith of the matter. He was, as he says, searching out the principles of political right. He was concerned not with the fact of power, but with its legitimacy. He saw that the central problem of politics is the problem of obedience. A large number of men live in voluntary servitude to a small portion of their number. What makes that obedience legitimate? He did not ask its origins. Its consequences he pointed out in that first and eternal sentence of his opening chapter. He was anxious to know how men can reconcile obedience with freedom. He did that in two distinct ways. He saw that, somehow or other, we must introduce the notion of contract into the state. There must be a reciprocity of rights and duties. Power, by its very nature, must be limited by the purpose for which the state exists. That is, of course, to cut at the roots of abstract individualism; but Rousseau's treatment, as Professor Vaughan rightly points out, is made difficult by his hesitation as to the nature of the contract he invokes. If it is an historic contract, students of history will insist upon its failure to appear in the evidence; if it is metaphysical, it is too idealistic to be a criterion of action. Nor is his second point more simple. He insisted that the state was essentially a will-organization, which, of course, implied an effort to secure moral unanimity for the actions of the state. The famous hypothesis of the general will is in reality an attempt to extract from each member of the state that part of himself which urges him to his highest point of social virtue. The fusion of such parts is made by him the effective criterion of political adequacy.

In the technical sense of administrative application it is possible to be more doubtful than Professor Vaughan as to whether Rousseau's theory is in fact a working hypothesis. Unquestionably he was right in his division between state and government and in his conference of ultimate power upon the former alone. It is, however, obvious that no system of politics would be workable which involved so frequent an elicitation of the sovereign's will as Rousseau in theory demanded. The business of the modern state is too complex to be conducted by perpetual referenda; and, in actual practice, governments are bound, when they can obtain the necessary support, to act as they on occasion may deem warranted. Rousseau's doctrine, in any case, will, sharpened on the whetstone of life, mean little more than majority rule. We shall not easily surrender the convenience that has been administratively secured by the transition from the impossible medieval system of unanimous judgments. But even the hypothesis of majority rule is in fact too simple to cover the case. What Rousseau's system like any other, does, is to leave power in the hands of that minority which is able most effectively to manipulate the inert mass of the population.

It is clear, in short, that Rousseau's attempt to secure a coalescence of all wills in the state for action is impossible. It may have served in Athens; but in the modern community, and for the purposes of everyday life, it is remote from the facts we encounter. We cannot avoid, that is to say, the device of representation. The scale of our social life demands specialization of function. The business of the modern citizen is not to ask, what shall I do? But, rather, whom shall I trust? We still realize that Rousseau's limitation of governmental power is the foundation of all adequate political structure; but we cannot hope to achieve its limitations in the fashion he demanded. That is because all power that is not consciously organized and exercised in the same fashion as the power of government has no practical utility about it. Yet it was Rousseau himself, when he denied the impulse to association a place in the state, who destroyed the main method by which the purpose of government may be kept unstained. The real check upon corruption is not to be found in the unorganized welter of general experience but in the organized pressure of social groups collectively striving for the mastery of the state.

If I understand Professor Vaughan aright he would avoid these difficulties by an interpretation of Rousseau which is singularly akin to that of Dr. Bosanquet. Sovereignty is in the state, and the state is to be the whole hierarchy of social institutions. Sovereignty, therefore, is to belong to the general will, to the acts, that is to say, of the state's best self. But this, surely, does little more than move the inquiry back a further stage. The state must find organs for the expression of its selfhood; and neither Rousseau nor his followers have given us an adequate ethical criterion for the detection of its presence. In the hands of Rousseau's disciples, as the fifth section of Professor Vaughan's introduction will demonstrate, it becomes rather like the assertion that right and truth must prevail; but it gives us no method by which to detect with certainty the presence of right and truth. And if the state is this hierarchy of institutions, we are not told what must be our course of action if they conflict. We could not, as Hegel urged, take as paramount the duty of obedience to government; for such action would involve the abdication of that moral self which it is our main business to contribute to the political process.

The truth surely is that Rousseau, like Hegel and Green, was searching for the secret of social unity. His hypotheses break down simply because in a sense which admits of administrative application there is no such thing as social unity. Even if we were agreed upon the ultimate aim, there is divergence upon methods; even if we were agreed upon methods, there is divergence as to what persons may most usefully be our instruments. The real value of Rousseau's work is not, as Professor Vaughan urges, in his discovery either of the corporate self or the general will but in the form and eloquence in which he clothed his questions. He is greater than Hobbes simply because the latter neglected the moral implications of his Leviathan, Locke was far too muddled and too immediate to challenge comparison; Hegel wrote with one eye, doubtless, upon eternal truth but with the other upon the King of Prussia. But it was not until it became evident that a certain conflict must be postulated as the basis of social inquiry that the means for answering Rousseau's questions became evident. The method will be not philosophic, but in part historic and in part psychological. It will be tested by statesman and civil servant, by trade-unionist and business man before its adequacy is demonstrated. It is the incurable defect of the idealist hypothesis that it makes abstraction of these the real persons, by whom our destiny is controlled.

H. J. L.

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Jim

Jim, the Story of a Backwoods Police Dog, by Major Charles G. D. Roberts. New York: The Macmillan Co.

THIS is a pretty good story, with a dog in the Sherlock Holmes rôle, surrounded by great husky backwoodsmen who all play Dr. Watson. Major Roberts knows his men and his setting and does it quite well. He makes no mistakes in details, he has the local color and language down fine, and even the tone of the story is sometimes almost realistic. But it never is more: never real. It is merely high-grade second-rate stuff. It is quite as accurate and complete and unconvincing as are David Belasco's stage settings.

There's a reason. With Belasco, it is simply that he doesn't see true: doesn't want to see true: loves his dreams of life better than Life, whose strange soul he won't look at. With Major Roberts the reason is more creditable: he is doing the best that he can, but he hasn't the faintest notion of what human beings are like. He notes with exactness their appearance, their language and dress, and he senses their surface reactions, but he can't see inside.

Yet he is a seer and an artist—otherwise why bother to write this review?—and he has a field of his own where he does see true, unlike Belasco. He knows animal nature. He knows it as Meredith knew women or as Synge knew the Irish. In the latter part of this book there is a story of an eagle that makes you feel, while you read it, that you yourself are an eagle for the moment, proud, obstinate, fierce. And the next time you see an eagle you will know him better than you do your own uncle. You will have been one yourself.

It is a splendid experience. It is well worth the price of the book—which is not mentioned here out of deference to Mr. Burleson's wishes but which may be described as quite the usual price, and as less than two bones. Also just at the end there is another experience that is also worth while: a story about a skunk: when you have read it you have been a skunk too. You don't have to read it, I hasten to add. Nobody is going to make you be one of them. But speaking as one who has trusted our friend, Magician Roberts, and tried it, I can tell you we skunks are a fastidious, brave, and dignified lot, with a coolness and courage that only the best soldiers can equal, and a cleanliness as pure as a maiden's or possibly purer. (It is so seldom I get to be a maiden, now that I have stopped reading George Meredith, that I cannot estimate it more exactly, but that is near enough.)

As for Major Roberts, he has never been a maiden, or a man, or a major. Though he doubtless has always conducted himself as a man, and has behaved like the most majorly major that was ever born in Majorville, that is nevertheless not his real self. That is not where he lives. But he has certainly been an eagle and a skunk, and most things in between, and has flown on wings and crawled as the serpent and run on four feet.

If you have read Thompson Seton and been thoroughly sickened of animal stuff, you may hesitate to try Major Roberts, or may not think it worth while. But he is no more like Seton in his insight than Synge is like poor Victor Herbert. He is a genius who admittedly needs sifting, but still he's a genius. He has a thrilling gift of making you know how wild animals feel. You will certainly enjoy being an eagle, and, if you are truly catholic, a skunk.

L. E. Hewson.

The Barrel-Organ

The New Morning, by Alfred Noyes. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co.

THE one-time popularity of Alfred Noyes can be explained by the popularity of the instrument which he has immortalized in his invitation to Kew. The barrel-organ has all the qualities that appeal to the great majority —it has a loud buoyance, a thumping, metallic rhythm; it plays melodies that are gratifyingly familiar; its stock in trade is a small but tested assortment that is aimed obviously at the many; and, greatest of all virtues, it changes its tune with enviable complaisance. Of all contemporary performers on the street-piano, Alfred Noyes has turned the handle with the greatest dexterity. He knows when to be muscular, when to speed up the machine, when to put in a new roll. In The Wine Press, published at the time of the second Balkan War, the poet, forgetting that his light lyrical voice was not qualified to sound either a call to take up arms or a call to ground them, spilled gallons of bloody ink in a plea for universal peace. War, and in particular, modern war, was shown in its horrors; it was bestial, degenerate, unspeakable; a thing no civilized man could tolerate. This was in 1913. Two years later these sentiments were, strictly speaking, not popular. And Noyes, without pausing to change the rhythm, obligingly shifted his ground and played the tune that was desired. In 1917 we find him not only tolerating war but celebrating it. In 1918 he begins to assume the rôle of poetic ambassador; he lets orotund generalities take the place of his once limited but infectious minstrelsy—and, by a queer ironic twist, loses the very audience he was so anxious to please.

In his less political and darkly serious moods he did please them. He seldom failed to establish an almost personal bond between himself and his public. People had such a good time reading his earlier poetry because Noyes had such a good time writing it. Rhyme was not merely his trade, it was his morning exercise. His own relish filled and quickened the glees and catches like Forty Singing Seamen, the waggish bravado of Black Bill's Honeymoon, the lusty choruses in Tales of the Mermaid Tavern, the inspired nonsense of much of The Forest of Wild Thyme. And that glorified jingle which epitomizes him, The Barrel-Organ, is a triumph of robust banality; trite in thought and even more hackneyed in expression, it pleases almost everyone because of its contagious vivacity, its swinging, sentimental heartiness. Had Noyes held to his minstrel measures he undoubtedly would have held his mixed audience. But, misled by his facility, he attempts programmes and profundities beyond the power of his always flowing pen; he writes loosely instead of largely.

The New Morning illustrates this tendency. Many motives are here revealed, but none so plainly as the impulse to make a glib optimism take the place of analysis or interpretation, to indulge in romantic generalities, to "cast a glamour" (according to the paper-jacket) over the deeds of men. Without waiting to inquire how dubious a service this last purpose may be, it is evident that the charm, the careless fluency has gone. In the swing of the ballad, one did not stop to complain of the absence of the searching phrase; in the more ambitious verses the lack is only too apparent.

One might even be willing to condone Noyes's loss of musical magic if the gain in thought were a real compensation. But in substance the falling-off is still greater. The tone in most of the recent verses is of a disgruntled impe-

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rialist, alternating between a petulant conservatism and an incredibly naïf chauvinism. Here is an illustration of the latter mood:

There's only one great ghost I know could make that 'larum ring.
It's the captain that we knew
In the ancient buff and blue,
It's our Englishman, George Washington, who fought the German king!

The examples of the former impulse fill the volume. Noyes has shrugged off the rather too loose mantle of Swinburne to put on the somewhat tighter uniform of the Kipling drummer. Songs of the Trawlers and Sea Poems, a section that might have been rejected from the manuscript of Departmental Ballads, Slave and Emperor, The Night of the Lion—all these betray accents even more reactionary than his own. But it is in the Five Criticisms that he is most intemperate. The fifth of these is preceded by a prose argument in which, after replying to an anonymous defender of "the new lawlessness," Noyes writes:

> This vicious lawlessness the writer described definitely, and he paid his tribute to dishonor as openly and brutally as any of the Bolsheviki could have done. I had always known that this was the real ground of the latter-day onslaught on some of the noblest literature of the past; but I had never seen it openly confessed before. The time has now surely come when, if our civilization is to make any fight at all against the new "red ruin and breaking up of laws," we must cease to belaud our slackminded, latter-day "literature of rebellion" for its cleverness in making scraps of paper out of the plain laws of right and wrong. It has been doing this for more than twenty-five years, and the same has become fashionable among those who are too busy to read carefully or understand fully what pitfalls are being prepared for their own feet and the feet of their children.

The sonnets that follow by way of answer make us realize how far Noyes has wandered and in what a downward direction, since The Enchanted Island. Glints of the vanished power are in the new volume but they are faint and fitful, reminders of how out-of-date these rhymed polemics have grown. Had Noyes lived in an earlier age he would have maintained the earlier tradition with skill and grace. He would have been a most successful minnesinger, a troubadour looked-for at every inn and market-place for his melodious choruses, tickling lords and vassals with his rollicking staves, earning his welcome with his whimsy rather than his wit. In those days he would have remained outside of the realm of disputation, artistic controversies, political imbroglios. And in his own field he would have reigned, a sort of sublimated street-pianist, enchanting the populace with nothing more pretentious than a box of tunes.

LOUIS UNTERMEYER.

Contributors

to this issue

WILLIAM HARD, a regular contributor to the New Republic.

JOHN DEWEY, author of Democracy and Education and other books on education and metaphysics.

M. E. RAVAGE, author of An American in the Making.

SHELTON HALE has served as Recording Secretary of the Supreme War Council at Paris during the Peace Conference.



The Chances are She Did

Did you select your automobile all by yourself? On second thought, didn't something your wife said about the upholstery prove a factor in your choice? One large manufacturer says women influence the sale of nine out of every ten automobiles. Women have a voice in determining the choice of probably 200,000 of the cars bought yearly by Delineator families. If you manufacture something used by American homes, advertise it to women in

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

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